









UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN 
FACULTY OF LAW 
SCHOOL FOR ADVANCED LEGAL STUDIES 
 
 Application Program Interfaces and the Law of Copyright in South Africa:  
 A Proposal for an Optimal Approach  
By 
Azola Siphe Futshane 
(FTSAZO001) 
Research Dissertation Submitted for the Approval of Senate in fulfilment of part of the 
requirements for the Master of Law in Intellectual Property Law in approved courses 
and a minor dissertation. The other part of the fulfilment for this qualification was the 
completion of a program of courses. 
Supervisor:  
Dr. Lee-Ann Tong 






















The copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No 
quotation from it or information derived from it is to be 
published without full acknowledgement of the source. 
The thesis is to be used for private study or non-
commercial research purposes only. 
 
Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms 










The copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No 
quotation from it or information derived from it is to 
be published without full acknowledgement of the 
source. 
 
The thesis is to be used for private study or non-
commercial research purposes only. 
 
Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in 
terms of the non-exclusive license granted to UCT 






Research dissertation presented for the approval of Senate in fulfilment of part of the 
requirements for the degree of Masters of Law in approved courses and a minor 
dissertation. The other part of the requirement for this qualification is the completion 
of a programme of courses. 
 
I hereby declare that I have read and understood the regulations governing the 
submission of LLM dissertations, including those relating to length and plagiarism, as 
contained in the rules of this University, and that this dissertation conforms to those 
regulations. 
 
I authorize the University of Cape Town to reproduce for the purpose of research the 
whole or any portion of the contents in any manner whatsoever. 
4 
I, Azola Futshane, know that plagiarism is wrong. Plagiarism is to use another’s work 
and pretend that it is one’s own. 
I have used the footnoting convention for citation and referencing. Each contribution 
to, and quotation in, this dissertation from the work(s) of other people has been duly 
attributed, and has been cited and referenced. 
This dissertation is my own work. 
I have not allowed, and will not allow, anyone to copy my work with the intention of 
passing it off as his or her own work. 
Signature:  





Application Program Interfaces are simple computer programs that enable other 
pieces of software to call on each other so as to operate in tandem. They are solely 
designed to perform this singular function, yet they have a significant impact on 
computer software development. The benefits of Application Program Interfaces 
include the increased speed and efficiency of computer program development. In 
essence, Application Program Interfaces enable interoperability between different 
computer programs that may otherwise have been unable to operate with each other. 
Developers are saved from the onerous task of having to develop new programs that 
will be able to work with their own, because the Application Program Interface acts as 
a catalyst between the different programs, as it were. 
Due to the function they perform, Application Program Interfaces are essential to 
computer software development, and are of high economic value. As Application 
Program Interfaces are computer programs, they are protected under the law of 
Copyright. This means that developers of Application Program Interfaces are able to 
exercise exclusive rights in copyright over these pieces of technology. This is 
problematic in the programming community, where there is a rapidly growing trend 
towards using and producing open source software. As such, there is a friction created 
between programmers who seek to use Application Program Interfaces freely, and the 
copyright owners who seek to derive an economic benefit. 
There is no controversy as to whether the literal elements of an Application Program 
Interface may be eligible for copyright or not. There is debate, however, as to whether, 
and to what extent, the non-literal elements of an Application Program Interface may 
be eligible for copyright. This debate brings to the fore the age-old idea-expression 
dichotomy, and the question of what elements constitute an idea or an expression. 
This paper will investigate the approach to Application Program Interfaces and 
copyrightability in South Africa, and make proposals as to the approach that ought to 
be taken. Guidance will be taken from the precedent and legal debates ongoing in 
other jurisdictions.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background 
Whether Application Programming Interfaces (hereafter ‘APIs’) should be freely 
available for use under the laws of copyright or not is an issue worth billions of Dollars.1 
The magnitude of the monies implicated underlies the importance of software in the 
modern technological age.  
Computer software applied in smartphones, laptops, tablets, desktops, super-
computers and their ilk is central2 to endless facets of global development including 
the worlds of business, healthcare and science; as well as the financial sector and the 
social landscape. It is of value not only because of its economic uses in global 
development, but also because of the proprietary value found in its ‘intellectual 
property-dense material like programming codes, technical specifications, graphic 
displays and user manuals’.3 Computer programs, in particular, are the driving force 
of software. Key to their interoperability, which is their ability to work with each other 
to achieve designated results4, is the API. 
An API is a public specification which is used as an interface between 
components of software so that they may communicate with each other.5 It includes a 
set of routines, protocols and tools used for building software applications, or in web 
development. Simply put, an API is comprised of code which is used in computer 
programming so that different applications may communicate with each other in order 
to operate in conjunction with each other, even if they are programmed in different 
languages. 
                                                          
1 This question formed the basis of recently-decided litigation in the USA between Oracle (PTY) Ltd and Google 
(PTY) Ltd in a claim which amounted to nine billion Dollars. This matter will be discussed below. 
2 Simon Crowfoot ‘Five Computer Programs We Use Everyday’ available at http://www.iceni.com/blog/five-
computer-programs-we-use-every-day/ accessed on 12 February 2018. 
3 Lee-Ann Tong ‘Copyright Protection for Computer Programs in South Africa: Aspects of Sui Generis 
Categorization’ (2009) 12 The Journal of World Intellectual Property 266 at 266. 
4 John Abbot ‘Reverse Engineering of Software: Copyright and Interoperability’ (2003) 14 J.L & Inf. Sci 7 at 16. 
5 Uri Sarid ‘A Non-Apocalypse: APIs, Copyright and Fair Use’ available at 




The API consists of packages split into classes which carry out methods. The 
methods are lines of code which produce required functions. The technical aspects of 
an API were best explained in Oracle6: 
‘An API is like a library. Each package is like a bookshelf in the library. Each class is like a book 
on the shelf. Each method is like a how-to-do-it chapter in a book. Go to the right shelf, select 
the right book, and open it to the chapter that covers the work you need. Every method and 
class is specified to carry out precise desired functions and, thus, the “declaration” (or “header”) 
line of code stating the specifications must be identical to carry out the given function.’7 
Due to their properties, APIs are prevalent in software development. They are 
used, for instance, by web applications that seek to use the infrastructure of Google 
Maps in order to provide GPS services to persons who use the respective web 
applications. The function that they serve is critical; they enable developers and 
programmers to create efficient networks of software which operate in tandem. 
 
1.2 APIs in the Context of Copyright 
  
1.2.1 Comparative Analysis of Copyright Treatment Using Foreign Law 
APIs are computer programs.8 Computer programs are treated differently in various 
jurisdictions. It is for this reason that it may be difficult to extrapolate principles from 
foreign law in order to receive guidance as to how our local law ought to be.9 
Nevertheless, in the absence of a rich body of literature concerning the treatment of 
APIs in South Africa, it is necessary to engage in a comparative analysis with other 
jurisdictions where judicial and academic debate is rife in relation to APIs and copyright 
specifically, or computer programs and copyright generally. 
It is for this reason that the law as applied in the United States of America 
(hereafter the USA) and the United Kingdom (hereafter the UK), respectively, has 
been chosen in order to provide ideas which may be explored and analysed. This is 
                                                          
6 Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google, Inc., 872 F. Supp. 2d 974 (N.D. Cal. 2012) at 5. 
7 This understanding of APIs was also used in the appeal judgment: Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., No. 13-1021 
(Fed. Cir. 2014). 
8 Shireen Smith ‘Are APIs Protectected by Copyright? – Google v Oracle’ available at 
https://blogs.mulesoft.com/dev/quiz/api-expert-knowledge-test/ accessed on 12 February 2018. 
9 Caroline B Ncube ‘ Equitable Intellectual Property Protection of Computer Programs In South Africa: Some 
Proposals For Reform’ (2012) 3 Stellenbosch Law Review 438 at 442. 
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so that a proposition may ultimately be put forward for application in the South African 
context. The reason that the USA has been chosen for analysis is that the question of 
the copyrightability10 of APIs has been directly dealt with in the controversial Oracle 
matter. The reason that analysis of the UK position is appropriate is twofold. Firstly, 
South African copyright law is largely based on UK copyright law so the two systems 
of law are not entirely divorced historically11; and secondly, the UK judiciary has taken 
a firm position on the issue of copyrightability and the non-literal elements of a 
computer program. Granted, this position is not limited to APIs but applies to computer 
programs generally. Nevertheless, the arguments in these jurisdictions are relevant 
because certain important themes, such as the ideas-expression dichotomy, are 
common to all three jurisdictions. 
 
1.2.2 Ideas-Expression Dichotomy 
Computer programs are unique in that they have characteristics that fit into both the 
definitions of copyrightable matter as well as patentable matter.12 These unique 
characteristics have made it difficult to categorise computer programs13, and even 
though it is widely accepted that they do not constitute inventions for the purpose of 
patent law, challenges persist as to how they should be treated in the realm of 
copyright.14 
Specifically, the ideas-expression dichotomy is a challenge with regards to 
computer programs. In copyright law, ideas are available to all persons and 
consequently do not attract protection, whereas expressions are the products of 
creative effort and are thus worthy of eligibility for copyright protection.15 The ideas-
expression dichotomy encapsulates this view that ideas and the expressions thereof 
are different.16 Problems arise in determining which component of a work constitutes 
                                                          
10 In this paper, ‘copyrightability’ and all variations thereof mean: ‘able to be eligible for copyright’. 
11 Ncube op cit note 9 at 442. 
12 See Ncube ibid at 439, who notes that the source code of a computer program is protectable under 
copyright, whilst the functionality may be protected in patent law. 
13 Charles R. McManis  ‘Intellectual Property Protection and Reverse Engineering of Computer Programs in the 
United States and the European Community’ (1993) 8 Berkeley Technology Law Journal 26 at 43. 
14 Tong op cit note 3 at 268. 
15 See Edward Samuels ‘The Idea-Expression Dichotomy in Copyright Law’ (1989) 56 Tennessee Law Review 321 
at 323. 
16 Matt Flinders ‘Protecting Computer Software – Analysis and Proposed Alternative’ (2007) 7 Journal of High 
Technology Law 71 at 78. 
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an idea, and which part qualifies as an expression.17 This issue appears to be focal in 
the question of whether APIs should be eligible for copyright or not. 
 
1.2.3 Literal and Non-Literal Components 
APIs consist of lines of code which cause computers to perform actions. Like all 
programs, APIs are created using source code. This is the component written by a 
programmer in a language legible to humans. It is subsequently translated into object 
code, which is the instruction in a form which can only be interpreted by computers.18 
This code is treated as a literary work across most jurisdictions party to the Agreement 
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (hereafter the ‘TRIPS 
Agreement’).19 In South Africa, however, it receives its own sui generis protection as 
a computer program work.20 
Copyright works across these three jurisdictions have literal and non-literal 
components. The definition of the latter differs slightly across the three jurisdictions 
under discussion. The literal part of a computer program is the actual written portion 
of the code.21 Copying of the literal component is always unlawful where it is 
substantial.22 This is determined with a greater emphasis on the consideration of the 
quality of the copied portion, rather than the amount.23 This much is the same in South 
Africa as it is in the other jurisdictions. Differences appear, however, in the manner in 
which the non-literal elements of a computer program are treated. 
In South Africa, there is little case law which considers copyright and computer 
programs.24 Nevertheless, the non-literal components of a computer program have 
                                                          
17 Ncube; Allen Rosen ‘Reconsidering the Idea/Expression Dichotomy’ (1992) 26 Universtiy of British Columbia 
Law Review 263 at 263. 
18 Roux de Villiers ‘Computer Programs and Copyright: The South African Perspective’ (2006) 123 SALJ 315 at 
334. 
19 Agreement on the Trade–Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS), 15 April 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197. 
20 Tong op cit note 3 at 268. 
21 Arjun Krishnan ‘Testing for Copyright Protection and Infringement in Non-Literal Elements of Computer 
Programs’ (2005) 10 Journal of Intellectual Property Rights 9 at 9 – 10; Richard Raysman & Peter Brown 
‘Copyright Infringement of Computer Software and the ‘Altai’ Test’ New York Law Journal 9 May 2006. 
22 David I Bainbridge ‘The Look and Feel of Computer Programs after Richardson v. Flanders’ (1993) 2 Laws, 
Computers and Artificial Intelligence 269 at 274. 
23Haupt t/a Softcopy v Brewers Marketing Intelligence (Pty) Ltd. and Others 2006 (4) SA 458 (SCA) para 45. 
24 Ncube op cit note 9 at 442. 
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been acknowledged to exist. In Pastel Software25 the court failed to distinguish 
between the infringement of the literal and non-literal components of software. 
Notwithstanding its conflation of the two elements, the court did acknowledge that 
computer programs do have a non-literal part.26 The non-literal component of a 
program includes the ‘structure, sequence of operations, functions, interfaces and 
methodologies.’27 In the USA, the non-literal component of a computer program has 
been described as its ‘structure, sequence and organisation.’28 In the UK, the non-
literal element of a computer program is it’s ‘structure, flow and sequence of 
operations’.29 In essence, this describes the functionality of the computer program.30 
Although the jurisdictions differ slightly in their interpretations of the non-literal 
components of a computer program, a common thread appears. The non-literal 
component pertains to the functionality of the program. In relation to APIs, issues arise 
as to whether this should be copyrightable or not. This is where the ideas-expression 
dichotomy comes into play. A court must decide whether the non-literal components 




1.3.1 Open Source Software 
 
Legal control over new creations is granted to the creators thereof for the purpose of 
preventing, delaying or increasing the cost of imitation by other persons in order to 
encourage innovation.31 Other reasons for legal protection of rights in intellectual 
property are canvassed below. Suffice it to say, the norm is for exclusive rights of 
exploitation to attach over a creation in favour of the creator. 
 
                                                          
25 Pastel Software (Pty) Ltd V Pink Software (Pty) Ltd and Another 399 JOC (T), as stated in Ncube ibid. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ncube op cit note 9 at 442. 
28 Oracle supra note 6 at 2. 
29 David I Bainbridge Introduction to Computer Law 2 ed (1993) 32. 
30 SAS Institute Inc v World Programming Ltd (2013) EWHC 69 (Ch). 
31 Mark A Lemley & Ziv Shafir ‘Who chooses Open-Source Software’ (2011) 78 University of Chicago Law 
Review 139 at 139. 
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In spite of this, open source software (hereafter OSS) has become increasingly 
important in markets that are the traditional domain of large proprietary groups.32 OSS 
is source code that any person can modify and share because, by design, it is 
accessible to the public.33 The existence of OSS is reliant on intellectual property rights 
that are contrary to the norm in that they keep software freely and widely accessible. 
This allows other developers to view the code, copy, alter, share and learn from it.34 It 
differs from code which is kept in private by its natural and juristic owners for any 
number of reasons, chief of which include the commercial exploitation of the 
developed software as a product. This is called proprietary software.35 
 
1.3.2 Interoperability and Its Importance 
Interoperability is defined as ‘the ability of different information technology systems 
and software applications to communicate, to exchange data accurately, effectively, 
and consistently, and to use the information that has been exchanged.’36 
This is important in the realm of computer programs as it means that different 
programs are able to work in conjunction with each other to create systems able to 
perform complex functions. An example that highlights the importance of 
interoperability is the Internet. It consists of software from innumerable suppliers that 
works in conjunction to create a multitude of electronic networks that enable the 
creation of an enormous telecommunications infrastructure.37 
APIs are unique in relation to other computer programs in that they are very 
simple programs designed to perform a single function – enabling program 
interoperability.38 This is relevant when determinations must be made as to the level 
                                                          
32 Vidya Atal & Kameshwari Shankar ‘Developers’ Incentives and Open Source Software Licensing: GPL vs BSD’ 
(2015) 15 B.E Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy 1381 at 1381.   
33 Lemley & Shafir op cit note 31 at 139.  
34 Ibid. 
35 As referred to in Tong op cit note 3 at 266. 
36 National Alliance for Health Information Technology ‘What Is Interoperability?’ available at www.nahit.org 
accessed on 12 February 2018. 
37 Kurt Rowley ‘Understanding Software Interoperability in a Technology Supported System of Education’ 
available at https://www.educause.edu/ir/library/pdf/cem9535.pdf accessed on 12 February 2018. 
38 John-Paul Kamath ‘APIs lead the Way to Interoperability’ available at 




and kind of creativity that goes into the development of an API, for purposes of 
separating ideas from expressions. 
 
1.3.3 Conflict between Interests of Copyright Owner and the Community 
Due to the fact that APIs are publicly available, issues arise where the creator of the 
respective API in any given circumstance seeks to exclude others from making use of 
the API, subject to some form of compensation. This creates a conflict between the 
rights of the private party who wrote the API, and the interests of the greater 
community in making use of the APIs.  
Broadly speaking, the question arises as to whether, and to what extent, the 
creator of an API ought to be able to exercise rights over the API. Specifically, the 
issue is whether APIs are, and should be, of a nature sufficient to warrant copyright 
protection; and, if so, whether exceptions to copyright infringement are available to 
users of APIs so that they may be precluded from attracting legal liability. 
 
1.4  Thesis Organisation 
 
1.4.1 Outline of Arguments 
This thesis will investigate two issues. The first issue concerns whether or not the non-
literal aspects of an API should be eligible for copyright protection under South African 
law. There will be no such investigation of the law pertaining to the literal components 
of an API as it is not a matter of controversy that source code may be eligible for 
copyright.39 It will be found that the non-literal elements of an API ought not to be 
copyrightable in South Africa. 
The second issue is whether, in the alternative event that APIs are 
copyrightable in South Africa, the available exceptions to infringement offer adequate 
protection for users40 of APIs. Where these exceptions do not provide an adequate 
                                                          
39 TRIPS Agreement op cit note 19, Article 10(1). 
40 In this paper, the term ‘user’ denotes a person who seeks to use a copyright work, even though she does not 
own any copyright in the work, and does not have the requisite licence from the copyright owner to use the 
work in any way. 
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legal avenue for users, proposals will be made in an attempt to resolve their 
shortcomings. These proposals will call for measures that have already been proposed 
in the Copyright Bill, subject to minor changes.  
These arguments and the reasoning behind them as they will appear in the 
paper are expanded upon below. 
 
1.4.1.1 Copyrightability of Non-Literal Components 
The Copyright Act of 197841 (hereafter the SA Copyright Act) protects computer 
programs.42 However, there is no statutory provision, case law or academic writing 
which concerns the copyrightability of APIs in South Africa. Specifically, there is no 
South African precedent or written source which gives direction as to whether the non-
literal components of an API should be eligible for copyright or not. 
In the US, the prevailing, albeit controversial, position is that the structure, 
sequence and organisation of an API should be copyrightable. This stems from the 
following reasoning. Firstly, the Copyright Act of 197643 (hereafter the US Copyright 
Act) protects computer programs as literary works, but does not protect mere ideas.44 
In order to determine if the structure, sequence and organisation of an API constitute 
an idea or an expression, it must be determined whether these non-literal elements 
are purely functional or whether they are imbued with creativity on the part of the 
author, sufficient to render them as expressions.45 On this basis, it is argued, it is 
possible for an API’s structure, sequence and organisation to contain functional and 
creative elements.46 Therefore, it is possible for an API to be copyrightable, and its 
eligibility must be determined on a case by case basis.47 
A counter position exists in the US, though it has been superseded by the 
approach described above.48 This counter position is to the effect that the structure, 
                                                          
41 Copyright Act 98 of 1978. 
42 Ibid, s2(1)(i). 
43 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. 
44 Ibid, s102(b). 
45 Oracle supra note 6 at 30. 





sequence and organisation of an API is functional.49 All of the inputs used to design it 
are ultimately utilitarian. Irrespective of the ingenuity required to create the structure, 
sequence and organisation of the API, all decisions are intended to achieve a 
functional result.50 As such, any design of the API is not expressive, but functional in 
that it is used to improve the efficiency of the API. Thus, for the purposes of copyright 
law it cannot be copyrightable.51  
In the UK, there is no specific comment on APIs. However, there is a blanket 
ban on the copyrightability of the functionality of computer programs.52 The Copyright, 
Designs and Designs Act53 (hereafter the UK Copyright Act) also protects computer 
programs as literary works, and offers no protection to mere ideas. Like the latter 
approach in the US, it is argued in the UK that an API is purely functional, with no room 
for expressive creation.54 It is viewed as a purely utilitarian work, such that its non-
literal components constituting its functionality cannot attract copyright protection. 
Furthermore, it is argued from a social perspective that granting copyright rights over 
an API would be prejudicial to the community because APIs are so integral to 
achieving interoperability between separate programs. If APIs were eligible for 
copyright, so it is argued, small players will be pushed out of the market.55 
I argue in favour of the approaches which find that APIs should not be eligible 
for copyright. I argue that the SA Copyright Act must be interpreted with the values of 
the Constitution56 in mind. These values call for fair and equitable balance between 
the rights of a copyright owner to his property, and the interests of the community in 
using available technology to boost its socio-economic welfare. 
In a similar manner to the copyright statutes in the other jurisdictions, the SA 
Copyright Act protects computer programs57 but not ideas. As there is no case law to 
offer direction as to what the approach in South Africa should be, I argue that the US 
and UK approaches are instructive and should be followed insofar as they postulate 
                                                          
49 Oracle supra note 6 at 34. 
50 Ibid at 35. 
51 Ibid at 34. 
52 This stems from the decision of the European Court in interpreting its doctrine as discussed in section 3.3 of 
this paper. 
53 Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. 
54 SAS supra note 30 para 40. 
55 Ibid para 31. 
56 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
57 SA Copyright Act op cit note 41, s2(1)(i). 
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that the true nature of an API is that of a functional work wherein no creative 
expression exists. I argue that this interpretation is not unfair in relation to the copyright 
owner of any API. The limitation of the copyright owner’s rights is fair when 
consideration is given to the overall benefit which accrues to the greater community. 
This, I argue, is constitutionally sound as it constitutes an equitable and proportional 
balance of interests between affected parties. 
 
1.4.1.2 Exceptions to Liability for Infringement 
The SA Copyright Act contains a closed list of acceptable uses which would otherwise 
constitute copyright infringement.58 Computer programs are included in these 
exceptions, however, I submit that it is highly doubtful that a user of an API would 
benefit from these exceptions. This is because the exceptions were originally designed 
to cater for traditional literary and artistic works. The uses that they permit are far too 
narrow for an API user who seeks to use the respective API for its interoperability 
function in order to make two or more separate programs operate in tandem.  
Guidance from the US approach shows that fair use is an effective method of 
catering to the needs of an API user.59 The fair use doctrine relates to an open list of 
uses which may be deemed to be fair even though they would otherwise offend a 
copyright owner’s rights in a work.60 It allows a judge to determine on a case by case 
basis if a user’s activities in relation to an API are excusable or not. The interoperability 
function of an API is a key factor in favour of a determination that the use is fair.61 
However, other factors such as the prejudice that the use may cause the copyright 
owner in the market operate against a finding of fair use.62 This means that the result 
of this enquiry is not certain or predictable. This will discourage API users who do not 
                                                          
58 Ibid, s12. 
59 It is well accepted that fair use offers greater protection than the fair dealing doctrine. See Gluseppina 
D'Agostino ‘Healing Fair Dealing – A Comparative Copyright Analysis of Canada’s Fair Dealing to U.K. Fair 
Dealing and U.S. Fair Use’ (2008) 53 McGIll Law Journal 309 at 314. 
60 D.R Jones ‘Commerciality and Fair Use’ (2015) 15 Wake Forest Journal of Business snd Intellectual Property 
Law 620 at 621; Sean O’Donnell ‘Fair Use in the UK, Fair Use in the USA … No Future, No Future’ (2007) 7 
Hibernian Law Journal 57 at 58. 
61 Oracle Appeal  supra note 7 at 61. 
62 Ibid at 60. 
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have the means to risk litigation with the copyright owner.63 This, it is argued, hinders 
innovation. The US also permits reverse engineering of computer programs64 but this 
is not a right of use. As such, though it is advantageous in that it permits the user an 
opportunity to understand the workings of an API, it is limited in that the user is still 
forced to construct her own API as opposed to being able to use the existing API. 
Furthermore, not all users will be skilled at reverse engineering. As such, only the few 
will benefit. 
The fair dealing doctrine as applied in the UK, in comparison, is narrowed to 
particular approved purposes65 and does not afford API users an opportunity to benefit 
from any existing exceptions to copyright infringement.  The UK Copyright Act provides 
a closed list of acceptable uses, but this list does not cater for uses in relation to APIs. 
As in the US, the UK does permit reverse engineering of computer programs.66 The 
same advantages and disadvantages as in the US appear in this regard. 
In light of all of the above, I argue that South African law must be less restrictive 
and allow for uses which better relate to the users of computer programs. I note that 
there is a new South African Copyright Bill67 (hereafter the Copyright Bill) which 
permits reverse engineering of computer programs and creates a right of fair use when 
the use is related to the interoperability of a computer program. In light of this Copyright 
Bill, I argue that the law will be adequately developed in a constitutionally sound 
manner if the Copyright Bill is enacted, subject to slight semantic changes to some of 
its provisions. I argue that the provisions of the Copyright Bill put into effect an 
equitable and proportional balance between the rights of the affected parties. 
 
1.4.2 Chapter Focus 
Chapter 2 will concern the justifications for the rights that attach to the creators of 
works and outline the basics of copyright law from a South African perspective. 
Chapter 2 will also describe the present South African position in relation to the 
                                                          
63 Timothy B. Lee ‘The Court that Created the Patent Troll Mess is Screwing Up Copyright Too’ available at 
https://www.vox.com/2014/5/9/5699960/this-court-decision-is-a-disaster-for-the-software-industryaccessed 
on 12 February 2018. 
64 Ncube op cit note 9 at 442. 
65 Catherine Colston ‘Fair Dealing: What is Fair?’ (1995) 10 Denning Law Journal 91 at 103. 
66 Ncube op cit note 9 at 442. 
67 Copyright Amendment Bill 2015 in GN 646 GG 39028 of 27 July 2015. 
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copyrightability of APIs and the law as it relates to exceptions to copyright infringement 
and APIs. Chapter 3 will investigate the approach to API copyrightability in the USA 
and the UK, and suggest that APIs should be not be eligible for copyright in South 
Africa. Chapter 4 will investigate the exceptions to copyright infringement in relation to 
APIs across the foreign jurisdictions, and suggest that there should be exceptions 
developed in South African law which better balance the rights of the copyright owner 
and the community of API users. Chapter 5 will offer the conclusion, including the 
implications on South Africa of all of the findings provided in the preceding Chapters. 
 
CHAPTER 2: COPYRIGHT IN CONTEXT: PREVAILING POSITION IN SOUTH 
AFRICA 
 
2.1 Justification for Copyright Protection 
 
2.1.1 Introduction 
These issues will call into question the balance of the intersts of the creator of a work 
– in this case the creator of the API – and the interests of the community. As such, to 
consider the nature of this balance properly it is necessary to be cognisant of the most 
accepted justification68 as to the reason that the authors of works are deserving of 
copyright protection. 
Over the years, different rationales have been put forward to provide the basis 
as to the reason that copyright protection exists.69 This is in light of the fact that 
copyright protection has been accused of, at its worst, serving to inhibit additional 
creation and thereby stifling creativity and development.70 As such, these rationales 
exist so that the copyright law does not operate in a void sans logical and sound 
                                                          
68 See Shubha Ghosh ‘Duty, Consequences, & Intellectual Property’ (2013) 10 University of St. Thomas Law 
Journal 801 at 801 who acknowledges that the incentivisation of creativity and invention of new works is often 
viewed as the justification for intellectual property rights. 
69 See Jean-Luc Piotraut ‘An Authors’ Rights-Based Copyright Law: The Fairness and Morality of French and 
American Law Compared’ (2006) 24 Cardozo Arts and Entertainment 549 at 553 – 554. 
70 See Katie Sykes ‘Towards a Public Justification of Copyright’ (2003) 61 University of Toronto Faculty Law 
Review 1 at 6 who notes the view that: ’in some instances, technical infractions [of copyright] are sometimes 
more in harmony with the spirit of the law than obedience would be.’ 
22 
 
reasoning as to its existence. The most common justification71 of relevance is the 
utilitarian theory.72  
 
2.1.2 Rationale behind Protection of Author Rights: Utilitarianism 
The prime economic justification for the protection of copyright is to provide authors 
with the ‘necessary incentives to create works’.73  
In economic terms, the public-good nature of copyright works necessitates the 
creation of incentives in the form of copyright protection in order for authors to create 
works; absent said incentives authors will not make works, or make enough of them.74 
Public goods possess the properties of being both non-rival and non-excludable. A 
good (or service) which is non-rival is one that can be enjoyed by more than one 
person at a given period.75 This means, for example, that the contents of a book, like 
the code of a computer program, can concurrently be used and enjoyed by more than 
one person without diminishing in value or quality. The term ‘non-excludable’ denotes, 
in the case of tangibles, property that cannot be ‘physically controlled’.76 What this 
means in the context of copyright works is that persons cannot be prevented from the 
enjoyment of said works.77 
The issue with public goods, then, lies in their non-excludability. A public good 
creates positive externalities in that it produces benefits which consumers can enjoy, 
while there is no way for the producer of the goods to prevent said enjoyment.78 This 
creates the problem of free-riding, which, simply put, means that nobody is going to 
pay for something that they can easily get for free. This results in market failure 
because the lack of incentive to pay means that, although the demand is being met, 
there is no concurrent transfer of payment from consumer to producer in exchange for 
                                                          
71 Sadulla Karjiker Open-Source Software and the Rationale for Copyright Protection of Computer Programs 
(published PhD thesis, Stellenbosch University, 2013) 34.  
72 Ibid at 32. 
73 Sykes op cit note 70 at 23. 
74 Karjiker op cit note 71 at 108. 
75 Mark A. Lemley ‘Ex Ante v Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property’ (2004) 71 University of Chicago Law 
Review 129 at 129. 
76 Karjiker op cit note 71 at 93. 
77 Ibid at 94. 
78 Ibid at 95. 
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the supply. Furthermore, it is inefficient for producers to take measures to prevent free-
riding where the cost of supplying the good to one more person is negligible, because 
people will simply stop consuming the good rather than start paying for it.79 In this 
regard, the cost of exclusion is non-negligible; and the producer cannot recover the 
costs for the benefit she has created. 
Market failure occurs as a product of free-riding behaviour which results from 
the public-good nature of copyright works, and their positive externalities. This failure 
leads to a ‘decrease in social welfare because copyright works are not produced at 
socially-desired levels’.80 Simply put, authors will not create works when others are 
able to freely benefit at the expense of the efforts of the authors. The optimal solution, 
then, is to rectify this situation by providing protection for authors in the form of property 
rights. Consequently, it is necessary to incentivise authors to create such works by 
‘eliminating such free-riding conduct, and enabling them to realise a sufficient return 
on their investments’.81 
 
2.1.3 Relevance of Justification 
This paper investigates whether APIs should be eligible for copyright or not in South 
Africa. It also determines whether the use of APIs by users should constitute an 
exception to copyright infringement or not. These questions necessarily induce a 
friction between the interests of those who seek to assert copyright rights over APIs, 
and those for whom the optimal outcome is that APIs be freely accessible. In 
navigating through this friction, it is important to remember that copyright protection is 
justified as it generally provides an incentive for creation.  
In sum, the economic rational is of persuasive value as it definitively shows that 
there is ample reason in logic for authors82 to receive copyright protection. This is 
important because, in instances where it may be tempting to consider only the broader 
interests of the community, it draws attention to the interests of the person who seeks 
to have copyright rights in a work. It calls for an equitable balancing of interests. 
                                                          
79 Ibid at 95. 
80 Ibid at 110. 
81 Ibid. 
82 In the event that they own copyright in the respective work. 
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Notwithstanding the above, however, a fair and balanced result will necessitate the 
limiting of the rights of the author. 
  
2.2 Copyright in Context 
 
2.2.1 Introduction 
While the rationale for the protection of authorship rights in copyright works has been 
dispensed with, it is necessary to place the forthcoming analysis into greater context 
so that the arguments may be considered against an informed background. What 
follows is a general description of copyright law, as it is treated on the international 
stage, followed by the basics of copyright law in South Africa. Then the treatment of 
computer programs in South Africa is investigated, with focus given to the questions 
of copyrightability and possible exceptions to infringement. The manner in which 
copyright is dealt with in the USA and the UK – specifically in regard to computer 
programs - will become apparent in the analyses of the approaches taken by the 
respective jurisdictions. 
 
2.2.2 International Treatment of Copyright  
The Berne Convention83 provides for the minimum protection that is to be given in 
respect of literary works in states that are party to it.84 The Berne Convention does not 
specifically make provisions in respect of computer programs.85 However, South Africa 
is a Member of the TRIPS Agreement which sets minimum standards of protection for 
intellectual property.86 Article 10(1) of the TRIPS Agreement provides that computer 
programs are to fall into the ambit of literary works as defined in the Berne Convention. 
Similarly, the WIPO Copyright Treaty87 stipulates that: 
                                                          
83 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 9 Septemeber 1886, as last revised at 
Paris on 24 July 1971, 1161 U.N.T.S. 30. 
84 Such states include South Africa, the US and the UK. 
85 Tong op cit note 3 at 267. 
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‘Computer programs are protected as literary works within the meaning of Article 2 of the Berne 
Convention. Such protection applies to computer programs, whatever may be the mode or form 
of their expression.’ 
It is for this reason that most countries which are party to these international 
legal instruments tend to classify computer programs as literary works. This includes 
the USA and the UK. In South Africa, however, computer programs are categorised 
as a sui generis work separate and distinct from literary works.88 Computer programs 
under the Copyright Act are consequently treated differently, in circumstances, to 
literary works. As a minimum, however, the rights enumerated in the Berne Convention 
in relation to literary works must attach to computer programs in our local statute as 
the TRIPS Agreement makes it so. 
What follows is a brief description of the requirements for copyright to subsist 
under the SA Copyright Act. 
 
2.2.3 Requirements for Copyright Eligibility per South African Law 
In order for a creation to be eligible for copyright protection, it must satisfy certain 
criteria. Chief amongst these is that it must be a work.89 The SA Copyright Act does 
not offer a definition for a work, but rather offers nine classes of works.90 Contrary to 
the norm in international treatment of literary works91, computer programs are 
expressly excluded from the ambit of this definition in the SA Copyright Act92 and are 
separated into their own category.93 
A creation must meet other requirements as well in order to attract copyright 
protection. These include that the author is a qualified person94, and that the work is 
                                                          
88 See SA Copyright Act op cit note 41, s1(1)(g); De Villiers op cit note 18 at 320. 
89 SA Copyright Act op cit note 41, s2(1). 
90 Owen Dean and Alison Dyer Dean & Dyer: Introduction to Intellectual Property Law (2014) 8.  
91 Most parties to the Berne Convention, including the US and the UK, protect computer programs as literary 
works. 
92 SA Copyright Act op cit note 41, s1(1)(g). 
93 Computer programs are dealt with in greater detail below. 
94 The SA Copyright Act confers copyright upon every eligible work which: 
 ‘the author or, in the case of a work of joint authorship, any one of the authors at the time [that] the work or 
a substantial part thereof is made, is a qualified person[.] That is: 
(a) in the case of an individual, a person who is a South African citizen or is domiciled or resident in the 
Republic; or 
(b) in the case of a juristic person, a body incorporated under the laws of the Republic.’ 
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in material form.95 When a computer program is written down, either on paper or 
electronically, it is already in a material form. The reason that a work must be in 
material form harks back to the ideas-expression dichotomy: there is no copyright in 
ideas. In Galago Publishers96 the SCA stated: 
‘Ideas, thoughts and facts merely existing in a man's brain are not 'works', and in that form, are 
not within the Copyright Act ...’97 
This is an integral theme which finds emphasis in this paper as it is used to 
distinguish the components of an API which should be copyrightable from those which 
shouldn’t. Even if a creation fits into the ambit of one of the established categories of 
works, and it is created by a qualified person, it will not be eligible for copyright if it is 
deemed to be a mere idea.98 The requirement of materiality solves this problem in 
relation to the literal components of a work. It is a more complicated issue, however, 
when the non-literal components of a work are considered as they cannot be put into 
material form. 
Lastly, once it has been adduced that a creation is a work in a material form, 
the primary requirement for copyright to subsist is originality of the work.99 The courts 
have found that a work will be original where it has not been merely copied, and 
constitutes an application of the author’s own skill and labour.100 
 
2.3  Approach to APIs in South Africa 
 
2.3.1 Introduction 
Statutory, judicial and academic writing on APIs in South Africa is scant. One is left to 
deduce from the existing positions in relation to computer programs in order to 
postulate as to what the law may be with regards to APIs. In light of this limitation, the 
current approaches as they may relate to APIs in South Africa are determined, both in 
                                                          
95 The SA Copyright Act op cit note 41, s44(1) provides that a work is deemed to have been made only at the 
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97 Ibid at 21. 
98 See SA Copyright Act note 41, s2(3). 




relation to their copyrightability and as to whether they may qualify under the 
exceptions to infringement in the SA Copyright Act. 
 
2.3.2 Copyrightability 
A computer program is defined as a set of instructions which are fixed or stored in any 
manner and which direct the operations of a computer to bring about a result.101 As is 
well documented in this text, South Africa does not protect computer programs as 
literary works. Unlike the case in both the USA and the UK, in South Africa computer 
programs are afforded their own protection under a sui generis category of the same 
name.102 
The SA Copyright Act provides an extensive list of exclusive rights which attach 
to the owner of the copyright in a computer program. The rights of reproduction103 and 
adaptation104 will be most relevant to developers who seek to establish copyright 
protection over the APIs in which they own rights. This involves using and replicating 
programs in part and in their entirety, including their non-literal elements. The SA 
Copyright Act does not address APIs and South African courts have yet to have 
occasion to pronounce on the copyrightability of APIs. This means that there is a 
vacuum in South African law in this regard. 
 
2.3.3 Exceptions to Infringement 
What appears from the SA Copyright Act is that the fair dealing provisions are similar 
to those available in the UK Copyright Act, even though both statutes treat computer 
programs as different types of works. The SA Copyright Act does not permit reverse 
engineering.105 This denies users the benefit of disassembling the API to discover its 
workings and use the knowledge to build a program of their own which has the same 
function. The SA Copyright Act does provide exceptions to infringement: 
                                                          
101 SA Copyright Act op cit note 41, s1(1). 
102 Ibid, s2(1)(i). 
103 Ibid, s11B(a). 
104 Ibid, s11B(f). 
105 Ncube op cit note 9 at 442, which defines reverse engineering as: ‘a variety of practices undertaken to 
understand how a software program is built and how it achieves its functionality’. 
28 
 
‘[C]opyright in a computer program shall not be infringed by a person who is in lawful 
possession of that computer program, or an authorized copy thereof, if— 
(a) he makes copies thereof to the extent reasonably necessary for back-up purposes; [or] 
(b) a copy so made is intended exclusively for personal or private purposes; and 
(c) such copy is destroyed when the possession of the computer program in question, or 
authorized copy thereof, ceases to be lawful.’106 
The SA Copyright Act also excepts certain other acts from infringement, 
including those done for the purposes of criticism or review of a work107; or for reporting 
current events108, reporting judicial proceedings109, or for teaching.110 This reflects the 
provisions in the UK Copyright Act, and creates similar issues. These issues relate to 
the fact that the narrow ambit of the categories of acceptable uses precludes computer 
programs, and by extension, APIs. Interestingly, section 12(3) of the SA Copyright Act 
provides: 
‘The copyright in a … work which is lawfully available to the public shall not be infringed by any 
quotation therefrom … Provided that the quotation shall be compatible with fair practice, that 
the extent thereof shall not exceed the extent justified by the purpose and that the source shall 
be mentioned, as well as the name of the author if it appears on the work.’ 
This raises the question: what does it mean to ‘quote’ in the context of computer 
programs? 
 
2.3.3.1 Quotations as a Fair Dealing Exception: Potential Applicability of 
s12(3) 
The SA Copyright Act identifies the quotation exception as applicable not only to 
literary and artistic works, but to computer programs as well.111 It is a general law of 
                                                          
106 SA Copyright Act op cit note 41, s19(2). 
107 Ibid, S12(1)(b). 
108 Ibid, s12(1)(c). 
109 Ibid, s12(2). 
110 Ibid, s12(4), subject to the use being compatible with fair practice and the source being mentioned with the 
name of the author (if such name appears on the work). 
111 Section 19(1) of the SA Copyright Act provides: ‘the provisions of section 12 (1) (b) and (c), (2), (3), (4), (5), 




interpretation that the legislature did not intend any provision to create an absurdity.112 
The inclusion of this specific exception must reasonably show that the legislature 
specifically intended for it to be a lawful exception when a user ‘quotes’ from a 
computer program. 
This brings certain questions to the fore. What does it mean to ‘quote’ from a 
computer program? Which part of the program is quotable? What constitutes ‘fair 
practice’ in relation to quoting from computer programs; and what kind of purposes are 
acceptable justifications for ‘quoting’ the work? Put differently, can a computer 
program be quoted for any purpose (such as using the ‘quote’ for functional purposes) 
or is there a limit to the types of reasons that a computer program may be quoted. 
Unfortunately, these questions have yet to be explored in South African jurisprudence. 
The provision remains open to interpretation. 
The context of the section 12 exceptions, with the Constitutional mandate for 
fair and just law in mind, is instructive. The quotations exception in particular was 
mandated by the Berne Convention which provides: 
‘It shall be permissible to make quotations from a work which has already been lawfully made 
available to the public … including quotations from newspaper articles and periodicals in the 
form of press summaries.’113 
The Berne Convention was created specifically to provide minimum standards 
of protection for literary works. Though the TRIPS Agreement subsequently gave 
computer programs the same minimum protection as those granted to literary works 
under the Berne Convention114, it is a fact that the Berne Convention was not written 
with computer programs in mind.115 It is apparent that this is the reason that the 
examples provided in the Article are ‘newspaper articles and periodicals in the form of 
press summaries’.116 Nevertheless, discerning the literal, plain meaning of the key 
word in the provision may provide guidance as to how computer programs may fit into 
this exception. The Cambridge Online Dictionary defines the word ‘quote’ as 
                                                          
112 Poswa v MEC for Economic Affairs, Environment and Tourism, Eastern Cape 2001 (3) SA 582 (SCA) para 10 – 
14. 
113 Berne Convention op cit note 83, Article 10(1). 
114 See Tong op cit note 3 at 70 for a salient discussion on protection having to be ‘the same as’ that provided 
for literary works. 
115 Ibid at 267. 
116 Berne Convention op cit note 83, Article 10(1). 
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‘repeat[ing] the words that someone else has said or written’.117 The word is also 
defined as ‘to repeat words from a text … written by another person.’118 The basic, 
literal meaning of the word means to copy words written by somebody else. 
Given the above, it seems that it is the source code of a computer program 
which a court might find quotable. This is the text which is legible to humans and is 
translated to the machine-readable text which is known as the object code. Collectively 
they cause the computer to perform a function. This seems uncontroversial, as it fits 
neatly within the range of things that one can ‘quote’ even when consideration is given 
to the plain meaning of the word ‘quote’. This means that the quotation exception may 
apply to APIs insofar as their literal component is concerned. The same cannot be 
said, however, for the non-literal components. A purposive interpretation of statute 
does not equate to an unwieldly bound beyond the confines of reason and logic.119 
The history of the origins of the provision, as well as the impossibility of quoting 
abstract devices such as structures, sequences, functions or methods make it clear 
that, at best, the quotation exception could allow users of computer programs to only 
quote the written code. 
It will be open to a court to decide what a user may permissibly quote an API 
for, as well as the extent to which this quoting may occur. The common purpose of 
quoting from the work of another is usually for the purpose of commentary. It is difficult, 
then, to see how this may be of use to a person who seeks to use the API of another 
programmer in the development of her own software. The position in relation to APIs, 
then, is not encouraging. Those who seek to use APIs without acquiring a licence from 
the copyright owner will not find much recourse in the statute as it is. 
 
CHAPTER 3: API’S AND COPYRIGHTABILITY 
 
3.1 Introduction 
                                                          
117 Cambridge Dictionary ‘Quote’ available at https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/quote 
accessed on 12 February 2018. 
118 English Oxford Living Dictionaries ‘Quote’ available at https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/quote 
accessed on 12 February 2018. 
119 See note 112 for a recount as to how an interpretation may not be absurd. 
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The manner in which APIs are treated in other jurisdictions offers guidance as to what 
the South African approach ought to be. In the USA, the question of whether APIs 
should be copyrightable has been determined by the courts in recent times, in the 
matter involving Oracle and Google.120 The USA law as applicable to computer 
programs, insofar as it is relevant, will appear from the case discussions. The 
reasoning and findings of the court a quo are delved into below, before the appeal 
finding is considered. For purposes of clarity, the matter as handled by the court a quo 
will be referred to as Oracle 1, whereas the judgment of the Federal Court of Appeals 
(hereafter the Federal Court) will be referred to as Oracle 2. This is compared to the 
European approach, with specific focus on the UK. 
Finally, an argument is made as to a position appropriate for South Africa. 
Though there is no case law dealing with APIs in South Africa, consideration of the 
local treatment of computer programs and copyright, issues of the rights of the 
copyright owner and the public interest against a constitutional background, as well as 
analysis of the approaches in the abovementioned foreign jurisdictions are used to 
support a proposal as to the stance that should be taken in South Africa. 
 
3.2 USA Approach 
 
3.2.1 Summary of USA Approach 
 
APIs are eligible for copyright in the USA.121 It has been found, at the level of the 
Federal Court, that the literal components of an API may be copyrightable; and that 
the non-literal components of an API may constitute an expression which is worthy of 
copyright protection. The stance in relation to the latter is as it is for the reason that 
the structure, sequence and organisation of an API can only fall short of copyright 
eligibility where it constitutes a mere idea.122 This will be the case where no creative 
input on the part of the creator of the work is identified. Creative input requires that the 
programmer incorporate elements into the structure and organisation of the work 
which are more than the absolute minimum which is necessary to achieve the intended 
                                                          
120 This includes both of the Oracle cases. See supra note 6 and 7. 
121 Due to the finding in Oracle Appeal supra note 7.  
122 Ibid at 43. 
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function of the work.123 In other words, the structure of an API will constitute an 
expression where it contains more than the minimum required to achieve its 
function.124 
 
This position is controversial and has been duly received with much criticism in 
American legal commentary. The prior position, as is outlined below in Oracle 1, has 
been much preferred by advocates of open access.125 This position is to the effect that 
APIs cannot be eligible for copyright insofar as their structure and organisation is to 
achieve a functional purpose.126 That means that any changes to the non-literal 
components of an API are not creative, but rather utilitarian because the reason for 
the change is to improve the functioning of the API.127 
 
What follows below is a discussion of the Oracle matter, including the 
development of the law over time in order to paint the background against which the 
legal reasoning and conclusions occur. What appears from the case discussion is that 
the question of what constitutes an idea and what constitutes an expression is the 
issue at hand. 
 
JAVA was developed by a company named Sun Microsystems. It is a virtual 
platform which enables developers of software to write programs that are operable on 
different types of computer hardware without a need for the programs to be re-written 
for each different type.128 It consists, amongst other things, of a set of pre-written 
programs which enable various commands to be carried out. These pre-written 
programs comprise the JAVA API. Prior to proceedings, the JAVA API consisted of 
166 packages, which were divided into 600 classes which could carry out more than 
6000 methods.129  
 
                                                          
123 Ibid at 64. 
124 Ibid. 
125 See Peter S. Menell ‘’API Copyrightability Bleak House: Unraveling and Repairing the Oracle v Google 
Jurisdictional Mess’ (2016) 31 Berkely Technology Law Journal 1515 for a full criticism on the Oracle 2 finding. 
126 Oracle supra note 6 at 30. 
127 Oracle supra note 6 at 22. 
128 Ibid at 4. 
129 Ibid at 5. 
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What is relevant is that Google replicated the lines of code, known as 
‘declarations’ or ‘headers’, which specified the names, functions and parameters of 
the methods and classes of 37 packages of the JAVA API to use in its own Android 
Platform.130  However, Google used its own, different, code to implement the methods 
and classes of the packages. Oracle, the plaintiff, bought JAVA from Sun 
Microsystems then made a claim of copyright infringement against Google for its 
replication of the 37 packages. The Court proceeded with the view that both parties 
accepted that Google had not literally copied the JAVA software, but rather, it had 
come up with its own way of implementing the 37 API packages. 
 
The issue that the court had to deal with was whether the ‘structure, sequence 
and organisation’ of the 37 elements of the Java API which Google had copied were 
eligible for copyright, as well as a claim that Google had unlawfully copied the names 
of the methods and classes and packages. Put differently, the court had to determine 
whether Google was free to replicate the names, organisation of names, and 
functionality of the 37 packages of the JAVA API. 
 
3.2.2 Oracle v Google 1 
 
3.2.2.1 Findings of the Court 
The court finds that, so long as the code used to implement each method in the JAVA 
API is original and belongs to its developer, anyone may write code to implement the 
methods. Copyright law does not extend a right over any of the ways to implement a 
method or a function. The method specification is the idea, whereas the method 
implementation is the expression in this case. On this basis, the court holds that there 
is no copyright in a JAVA method specification.131  
Furthermore, in order to carry out the specific functions of the JAVA API, it is 
necessary that the method specification is identical to the one set forth in the 
declaration of the JAVA API, per the JAVA rules.132 For this reason, there are no 
alternative methods to achieve the same result. On this basis, the application of the 
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131 Ibid at 35. 
132 Ibid at 7. 
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merger doctrine means that there is no copyright infringement in Google’s use of 
identical declarations to the JAVA API declaration.133 Due to the name doctrine, the 
court concludes that there is no copyright infringement caused by Google’s use of 
method names which are identical to those found in the JAVA API.134 Lastly, the court 
finds that Google is permitted to organise its methods in the same way as they were 
grouped in the JAVA API, because the overall set-up constituted a command structure 
for a method of operation of the API.135  
In other words, that particular structure carried out the function of enabling the 
API to operate. It allowed for interoperability because millions of lines of code written 
by other programmers are written using that command structure, meaning that these 
lines of code would not be able to run on Android unless Android also made use of 
that command structure.136 The fact that it has a functional use of interoperability 
illustrates, as argued by the court, that the organisation of the methods of the JAVA 
API are a functional system or method of use, which disqualifies them from copyright 
eligibility per the US Copyright Act.137 
 
3.2.2.2 Reasoning of the Court 
The judgement began with a consideration of the plaintiff’s claim of copyright over the 
names (and other such short-phrases) of methods, classes and packages. The court 
noted the rule as espoused by the US Copyright Office and followed in Sega.138 It 
stipulates that ‘copyright law does not protect names, titles [or] short-phrases.’139 
The court then turned to the development of the law in order to deal with the 
more complex question of the copyrightability of computer programs and their 
structure, sequence and organisation. In the seminal case Baker140, which pre-dated 
the advent of computers, the Supreme Court found that the copyright in a literary work 
of mathematical science cannot give the author exclusive rights over the methods 
                                                          
133 Ibid. 
134 Ibid at 35. 
135 Menell op cit note 125 at 1553. 
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137 See US Copyright Act note 43, s102(b). 
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contained therein.141 The US Copyright Act, enacted almost one hundred years after 
the Baker case, provides that computer programs are to be treated as literary works 
and creates a limitation on computer programs which is similar to that which was found 
in Baker: 
‘In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, 
procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless 
of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.’142 
The court then turned to the House Report143 accompanying this provision for 
guidance. It is necessary to quote it to its full extent in order to capture the fullness of 
the reasoning behind the court’s interpretation of the provision: 
‘Some concern has been expressed lest copyright in computer programs should extend 
protection to the methodology or processes adopted by the programmer, rather than merely to 
the ‘writing’ expressing his ideas. Section 102(b) is intended … to make clear that the 
expression adopted by the programmer is the copyrightable element in a computer program, 
and that the actual processes or methods embodied in the program are not within the scope of 
the copyright law.’144 
The court found that this served to entrench the well-established dichotomy 
between ideas and expressions in copyright. Mere ideas are available in the common 
pool of knowledge to be utilised by whomsoever; whereas actual expressions by a 
competent author in the correct circumstances attract copyright protection. The court 
then noted the National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted 
Works (CONTU)145, which found that copyright does not protect the electromechanical 
functioning of a machine. Consequently, it concluded that the preclusion from 
copyright protection of ‘procedures, processes and methods of operation’ found in the 
US Copyright Act was not at odds with the definition of computer programs in the US 
Copyright Act.146 
Finally, the court emphasised the CONTU recognition of the ‘merger rule’. This 
rule is designed to deal with instances where the idea and expression of a creation 
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are closely interlinked.147 It provides that language that is copyrighted may be lawfully 
copied where there are few alternatives to the language to make an expression of an 
idea.148 In other words, where there are limited options in copyrighted language to 
express something, it will not constitute an infringement for a third party to copy that 
language.149 In the realm of computer programs, the effect of this doctrine is that 
copyrighted specific instructions may be copied if they are the only and essential 
means of achieving a result.150 This must be determined on a case-by-case basis. This 
concept has been built-upon in case law.  
In Whelan151, the Court of Appeals developed a framework to deal with the non-
literal copying of computer software. It stated that the purpose or function of a utilitarian 
work would constitute the work’s idea, and everything else unnecessary for the 
purpose of the work would form a part of the expression of the idea.152 The structure 
of the program in this case was found to be copyrightable because there was a 
multiplicity of ways to structure a program in order to achieve the desired result.153 
Due to the high bar it sets for infringement, the Whelan case, though instructive, has 
not been followed.154 What has been followed is the abstract-filtration-comparison’ test 
as adopted in Computer Associates International.155 This test focuses on whether 
there has been substantial copying of the copyright material or not. The abstract-
filtration-comparison test operates by removing all elements of the work which are not 
copyrightable, and comparing the remaining portion using the usual test for substantial 
similarity.156 
First, the copyright program is divided into its structural components.157 Next, 
all structures which are not copyrightable are excluded from comparison. Such 
structures are those which are primarily functional; those which were designed to 
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optimise the speed and efficiency of the program, as well as its simplicity.158 These 
structures include not only those the design of which is dictated by efficiency (which 
encompasses ease of use)159; but also, those already in the public domain, such as 
elements of a computer program that have been freely accessible. As was defined in 
Gates Rubber160, structures are ‘a description of how the program operates in terms 
of its various functions’.161 In Lotus162 the court found that, because a program’s menu 
command hierarchy was essential in making use of the program’s functional 
capabilities, it constituted a ‘method of operation’, which could not be copyrighted.163 
This was so even though the programmer had made ‘expressive’ choices as to what 
the names of the command terms should be; and how they should be structured in 
their hierarchy. 
Given the above, the court in Oracle 1 confirmed that non-literal components of 
a program can be protected under copyright where the structure, sequence and 
organisation qualify as an expression of an idea, as opposed to actually being an 
idea.164 The court also supported the precedent set in Atari v Nintendo165, where it was 
found that a program was eligible for copyright if it had organisation and sequencing 
which were more than what was necessary to achieve the intended function of the 
program.166 As they were unnecessary, they were deemed to be creative elements 
eligible for copyright. This is an indication that non-literal elements of a program that 
are not necessary for the purposes of utility constitute an expression. The court noted 
that the judgments in Sega Enterprises167 and Connectix168 which confirmed that 
interface procedures which enable interoperability between programs are functional 
aspects which are not copyrightable per the US Copyright Act. 
Based on its consideration of the development of the law, the court found that 
there were principles which were relevant to the issue before it. Firstly, under the 
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merger doctrine, there can be no copyright in an expression which lacks no or few 
alternatives. Secondly, the names doctrine dictates that names and short-phrases may 
not be eligible for copyright. Thirdly, as provided by the US Copyright Act, copyright 
protection does not extend to any procedure, process, system or method of operation 
in any form.169 Further implications from the case law which the court found persuasive 
include that, where the non-literal elements of a program are not necessary to perform 
its function, such elements will be deemed expressions. This has the effect that there 
is no copyright eligibility for a non-literal purely functional component of a work. 
 
3.2.2.3 Analysis of Court Reasoning 
The reasoning of the court was grounded in the functional attributes of the JAVA 
API.170 Judge Alsup, who presided over the matter, acknowledged that the overall 
structure of the JAVA API was creative; however, its functions nevertheless 
constituted a command structure designed to carry out specific functions.171 Following 
the CONTU guidance as well as his interpretation of the merger doctrine, Alsup J found 
that there was no creative expression in the structure, sequence and organisation as 
it was the only and essential means for Google to perform the task.172 
This reasoning seems sound on a legal basis insofar as its underlying principle 
seems to be that there can be no creative expression where there is no choice in the 
manner of creating the work. It cannot be the case that a creation can qualify as an 
expression where there is little choice in how such creation could be made. The 
conclusion is the same whether the question of freedom of choice in making the work 
is viewed from the perspective of the author or from the alleged infringer.  
The court’s position is also correct to the extent that it finds that aspects of a 
work which serve no function properly constitute an expression. This is sensible 
because, if creativity is used to determine expressiveness, then utility must be 
indicative of a non-expressive component of a work. My opinion is that the question of 
functionality is indeed central to the task of separating an idea from an expression. As 
such, I submit that the court is correct in its view that the interoperability of an API is a 
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factor which indicates that the non-literal components of the API are functional. It will 
become clear forthwith that the Federal Court in this matter differs markedly in its 
opinion. Nevertheless, it seems that the reasoning employed by Alsup J is sound and 
instructive as to the direction that ought to be followed in South Africa.  
 
3.2.2.4 Implications of Judgment 
The immediate implications of the Oracle case were that Google, and the community 
at large, were able to freely write their own implementations for the purpose of carrying 
out the exact same functions of all methods in the JAVA API, using exactly the same 
method specifications and names.173 Effectively, APIs became freely available to the 
developer community. This is a benefit to innovation as APIs are integral to speedy 
software development; and it curbs the onset of a market monopoly. 
The impact of this judgment on persons who develop APIs is that they would 
not stand to gain a direct financial benefit from developing APIs, which may call into 
question whether there is sufficient incentive for the development of APIs. However, 
this is no issue in relation to incentivisation in the developer community as financial 
incentives are rarely the prime drivers of software development.174 This is made 
evident by the robust existence of the open-source movement which encourages and 
participates in the free sharing of software resources for development. More was to 
follow, however, as Oracle appealed the case. In the Federal Court, the ruling of the 
court a quo was overturned wholly. 
 
3.2.3 Oracle v Google 2 
 
3.2.3.1 Findings of the Court 
The Federal Court holds that the court a quo was incorrect in all of its findings, 
including with regards to the copyrightability of the declaring source code as well as 
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the structure, sequence and organisation of the API packages, and its reasoning in 
considering interoperability in the context of determining copyrightability.175 
 
3.2.3.2 Reasoning of the Court 
With regards to the issue of the copyrightability of the declaring source code, the court 
accepted the plaintiff’s argument that the court a quo misapplied the merger doctrine 
and incorrectly focused its analysis on the options available to Google at the time of 
infringement, rather than on the rights of the author at the creation of the JAVA APIs.176 
The court accepted the argument that the merger doctrine bars copyright protection 
for lines of source code only where the author had just one way, or a very limited 
number of ways, to write them. It found that the evidence showed that the author had 
a multitude of ways to select and arrange the lines of code that were copied by 
Google.177 Secondly, the court reiterated that the focus of analysis must be on the 
options available to the author at the time that the API packages were created. Google 
had not argued on this basis.178 For these two reasons, the court rejected that Google 
could succeed on the basis of the merger doctrine. 
The court then turned to the court a quo’s finding that short-phrases are not 
copyrightable on the basis that the Copyright Act provides that short-phrases can 
never be eligible for copyright. The court stated that this finding was wrong because it 
failed to consider that the real issue which must be considered in this regard is whether 
those short-phrases are creative or not. The court found that, when viewed in their 
entirety of over 6000 or 7000 lines of code, the short-phrases did embody an element 
of creativity.179 This decision indicates that, even in an instance concerning the 
copying of names, the ideas-expression dichotomy must still be at the forefront of a 
courts interpretation. 
The court then turned to the main issue concerning the structure, sequence and 
organisation of the API packages. It found that, because the API packages could have 
been organised in many ways and still have achieved the same function, and thus 
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were original and creative, the Copyright Act’s bar on methods of operation did not 
exclude them from copyright eligibility.180 This is because the creative nature of the 
organisation, as viewed by the court, rendered it an expression and not a mere 
functional aspect which effectively amounts to an idea.181 Lastly, the court found that 
the court a quo’s reliance on interoperability to show that the organisation of the 
packages was a command structure for the purpose of achieving a function was 
wrong, because determinations of interoperability are related to the question of fair 
use, and not copyrightability.182 In any case, it found that Google would still fail 
because Google’s copying of the organisation was not the only and essential means 
of achieving interoperability; rather, the court found, Google wanted to take advantage 
of the fact that most programmers were well versed and used to writing according to 
the JAVA API packages.183  
For these reasons, the reasoning of the court a quo was found to be wrong, 
and the JAVA API packages were held to be copyrightable in their entirety. This means 
that, as the law stands in the USA, the non-literal components of APIs can be eligible 
for copyright even though they are designed to achieve a function. 
 
3.2.3.3 Analysis of Court Reasoning  
 
The discussion of the Federal Court carried a theme of ‘software as creative 
expression.’184 It noted the concession of a Sun Microsystems software engineer who 
was of the opinion that there can be creativity in a single method declaration185; and 
likened a method declaration to a short phrase in a Charles Dickens novel.186 This 
view reflected in the way that the Federal Court interpreted the law. 
It has been argued, with good reason, that the Federal Court was wrong in law. 
Specifically, in its judgement it misinterpreted section 102(b) of the US Copyright Act, 
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misconstrued the software copyright jurisprudence of the Ninth Circuit187, conflated 
expressive and technological "creativity" and applied an overly rigid approach to the 
limiting doctrines of USA copyright law.188 Section 102(b) excludes ideas and 
processes from copyrightability. The court recognised these limitations but failed to 
distinguish between the question of what is copyrightable and the question of the 
scope of actions which constitute infringing activity.189 The incorrect view of the court 
was that the section was applicable at the inquiry pertaining to infringement, and not 
copyrightability.190 This is clear as Google argued that certain compilations of functions 
in the JAVA API were methods of operation which the provision excluded from 
copyright, but the Federal Court stated that the section merely restated the basic 
ideas-expression dichotomy and did not exclude methods.191 However, the dichotomy 
in USA law is traceable to the Baker case, which dealt with a literary work but set the 
underlying principle.192 Here, the court in that matter categorically excluded any 
method of accounting from copyrightability, though it found that the actual accounting 
book describing the method was eligible for copyright protection.193 
Secondly, the Federal Court embraced principals that the Ninth Circuit had 
rejected. Its decision to find that interoperability may be protectable under copyright 
contradicts the position of the Ninth Circuit which states that copyright law does not 
function to preclude interoperability. 194 Thirdly, the Federal Court’s view that the 
creativity needed in the design of an API constitutes an expression conflates 
expressive technology as applicable in copyright law and technological ‘creativity’.195 
Programmers need to reproduce the package, class and method names of a particular 
API in order to ensure that their programs ‘respond to the same inputs and produce 
the same outputs’ of the software they are operating with.196 That is so because the 
construction of those package, class and method names are purely functional: 
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everything in their composition is designed to produce a particular result. To consider 
the ingenuity that goes into an APIs functionality design as a ‘creative expression’ 
serves only to conflate expressions with ideas.197 It cannot be correct.  
South Africa is not bound by foreign law. Nevertheless, the fact that the decision 
of the Federal Court was based on obtuse reasoning undermines the persuasiveness 
of the decision. It would not be wise to derive guidance from a result borne of illogical 
thinking. Furthermore, the implications of the judgment erode its appeal. 
 
3.2.3.4 Implications of Judgment 
 
This judgment makes it possible that there are aspects of the non-literal elements of 
APIs which may be eligible for copyright, even though these arcane pieces of 
technology operate primarily to complete a simple function. Lawsuits may be brought 
against technology start-up companies and open source projects which have copied 
APIs for the purpose of ensuring that their software is compatible with other products. 
Defending an infringement case is expensive, so the practical implications of this 
judgement are prejudicial to players who lack financial strength. This in turn will curb 
use of APIs, as a preventative measure against possible lawsuits. 
 
It is reasonably foreseeable that this ruling has created a setting for the 
entrenchment of copyright monopolies in the software industry. This market 
dominance is similar to that which is created by patent laws, but endures for many 
more years under copyright than under the law of patents.198 This is so even though it 
is much easier to gain this market dominance through copyright than it is through 
patent law (which requires stringent criteria to be met). Menell argues that ‘copyright's 
low threshold for protection, complex scope of protection … and long duration, 
[overprotect] software and thereby undermin[e] technological innovation and 
competition.199 This is relevant because computer software, unlike other literary works, 
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serves a functional purpose akin to patentable inventions. The implication created by 
this ruling is like using the law of copyright to govern inventions: creating monopolies 
over technology becomes easier, and said monopolies are more robust under 
copyright than they would be under the law of patents. 
 
 
3.3 UK Approach 
 
3.3.1 Summary of UK Approach 
The position in the United Kingdom contrasts to the American approach in that it has 
been definitively held in the UK that the functionality of a computer program (which 
includes APIs) cannot be eligible for copyright. 
Copyright law in the UK is governed by the UK Copyright Act. It provides that 
computer programs are included within the definition of a literary work.200 As a literary 
work, any computer program must be original in order to attract copyright protection. 
As in South Africa, the question of originality turns on the skill, labour and application 
of judgment in creating the work. Where the expression of a computer program is the 
inevitable result of its function, it will not satisfy originality.201 As will be evident in the 
case discussion, the Information Society Directive202 guides the court’s treatment of 
computer software in law. Reference is made by the court to the Software Directive203 
where its provisions match those of the Council Directive.204 This finding is on the basis 
that the structures and methods that are developed in order to enable the operations 
of a program cannot be deemed to be creative expressions, but rather utilitarian 
measures which constitute ideas in the copyright law.205 The impact on society of 
permitting the copyrightability of the functionality of computer programs is also noted 
as a reason for the deviation from the approach in the USA: granting rights of copyright 
over the functionality of computer programs would create unfair monopolies in favour 
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of the copyright owners to the prejudice of all others.206 This is similar to the findings 
of the court a quo in the Oracle matter. 
A greater discussion of the reasoning and findings as applied in the UK is 
canvassed below in the discussion of SAS v World Programming.207 The matter 
concerned a dispute between the SAS Institute, the applicant, and its direct competitor 
which was WPL, the respondent. The SAS Institute was a program developer, and it 
created the SAS System which was an integrated network of analytical software 
programs that performed data processing and analysis tasks. The SAS System made 
use of Base SAS, which was a component of the SAS System that allowed its users 
to write programs using the SAS Language to manipulate data. The defendant 
developed alternative software called the World Programming System (WPS) which 
could interpret inputs written in the SAS language and produce the same results as 
the SAS System. In this way, it had developed software which could execute 
application programs that were written in the SAS language.208 In order to develop the 
WPS, the defendant had to copy the functionality of the Base SAS. It did this by closely 
replicating a substantial amount of the information provided in the SAS Manuals, which 
gave technical specifications as to the external workings (but not the internal workings, 
such as those relating to the code structure, or the object and source codes).209  
One of the claims of the applicant was that the defendant had copied its 
program.210 The underlying issue of the matter was the extent to which a developer 
may lawfully replicate the functions of another computer program. 
 
3.3.2 SAS v World Programming 
 
3.3.2.1 Findings of the Court 
The Appeal Court notes the distinction between ideas and the expression thereof, and 
supports the conclusion reached by the European Court211 (hereafter the CJEU) that 
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it is the form of the expression which is worthy of copyright. This echoes the reasoning 
of the judgment of the court a quo in the Oracle 1 case. The functionality of a computer 
program is not deemed to be an expression; rather, it is found that it constitutes an 
idea. The CJEU states that: 
‘Article 1(2) of Council Directive 91/250/EEC of 14 May 1991 on the legal protection of computer 
programs must be interpreted as meaning that neither the functionality of a computer program 
nor the programming language and the format of data files used in a computer program in order 
to exploit certain of its functions constitute a form of expression of that program and, as such, 
are not protected by copyright in computer programs …’212 
 
3.3.2.2 Reasoning of Court 
The court a quo resolved this question using guidance from the CJEU. Though the 
court and both of the contesting parties accepted the finding of the court a quo, which 
stated that the copying of a computer program’s functionality is not unlawful, it elected 
to relay the reasoning behind the finding. 
The court stated that the issue boils down to the ideas-expression dichotomy. 
It noted the TRIPS Agreement, which is incorporated into the legal order of the 
European Union and thus applies in the UK, which provides that copyright protection 
extends to expressions and not to ideas.213 The problem related to determining what, 
in the realm of computer programs, constituted an expression and what constituted an 
idea. This is the same issue that the Oracle judgements had to contend with, though 
the consideration there was specifically focused on APIs. The court considered the 
interpretations of the CJEU of its Directives. The Software Directive provides that: 
‘Whereas, in accordance with this principle of copyright, to the extent that logic, algorithms and 
programming languages comprise ideas and principles, those ideas and principles are not 
protected under this Directive.’214 
Furthermore, the Council Directive states that the ideas and principles which 
form the foundation of any element of a computer program, including those upon which 
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its interfaces are based, are not eligible for copyright protection.215 The court 
supported the argument made by the CJEU, however, that the object of protection is 
the expression of one’s intellectual creation.216 It based this reasoning on the finding 
of the CJEU in Infopaq217 where it is stated that works such as computer programs are 
only worthy of copyright protection if they are the intellectual creations of their authors. 
An intellectual creation refers to a work which the author has made expressive and 
creative choices in order to produce.218 This expression, it must be noted, is not limited 
to the object and source code. It includes all elements expressing the creativity of the 
author. Where the choices available to the author are restricted, it is unlikely that the 
work will constitute an intellectual creation (or the expression thereof).219 
In lieu of the above, the court concluded that there can be no originality in the 
functionality of a computer program, since the range of methods to implement an idea 
is so limited.220 The court was also motivated by policy concerns, as it stated that a 
contrary finding would have the effect of conferring a monopoly to a few companies. 
This would stymy market creation and innovation and run contrary to the goals of the 
Council Directive.221 For this reason, the court found that: 
‘…  if expression is dictated by technical function then the criterion of originality is not satisfied 
… where that is the case, the product is not an intellectual creation of the author at all.’222 
 
3.3.2.3 Analysis of Court Reasoning 
The UK position mirrors the approach taken in the USA, which is to consider only the 
expressive component of a work when considering if there has been infringement. The 
UK approach differs from the prevailing position as espoused in Oracle 2 with a strict 
stance that there is a limited array of ways to implement a method, and thus the 
implementations of methods (or, the functionality of a computer program) can never 
be eligible for copyright. This view is persuasive in that it takes into consideration the 
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reality that there can be no creativity in a creation where alternative options as to its 
constitution were minimal. I submit that the focus on the author’s ‘intellectual creation’ 
is limited to the produce of the author’s mind which properly fits into the ambit of that 
which may be protected in copyright. That is to say, the creation of a technological tool 
would not constitute an ‘intellectual creation’ insofar as its contents are functional for 
these purposes. Rather, it would be better fitted within the bounds of patents law. 
It is also sensible that the court did not want to grant rights in copyright over a 
functional, technological element of an API – its interoperability - when the law of 
patents is the proper domain for such aspects. Michael Morgan sets the position 
succinctly: ‘The ability to interoperate is … a valuable characteristic of computer 
products. While strong copyright protection serves the goal of encouraging diversity in 
literary expression, it does not serve the goal of encouraging standardization and 
interoperation of computer products.’223 It is easier to gain exclusive rights over a 
copyright work than it is for a patentable invention, and the protection under copyright 
is much longer.224 This is also the case in South Africa. It makes no sense to grant 
exclusive rights in copyright over the functional aspect of an APIs. 
 
3.3.2.4 Implications of Judgement 
The implication of this ruling is that software developers in the UK will struggle to hold 
any competitor who copies their computer program’s functionality liable for 
infringement unless there has been literal copying of the underlying code of the 
program as well. 
The findings in relation to computer programs in general are likely to apply to 
APIs in particular. APIs are computer programs which are, per the UK approach, 
completely utilitarian in how they operate. Their non-literal components will be deemed 
to merely constitute an idea, which is not worthy of copyright protection, insofar as 
they have a functional purpose. This echoes the basic sentiment of the court a quo in 
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the Oracle matter. It seems like a logical conclusion which follows from the fact that 
copyright is intended to protect creative expression. In making this decision, this court 
has shown that it is not confused by the dual nature of computer programs – that is, 
their having a functional technological nature which might fit more comfortably under 
patent law, as well as their literary aspect which is moulded to fit into the law of 
copyright. They have considered this purely as a literary work, which is what their law 
dictates, and found that its functional aspects cannot be protected under copyright as 
they lack the necessary creative element.  
It is also interesting that the court sees fit to pay consideration to the view that 
permitting the copyrightability of the functionality of computer programs would be 
detrimental to competition in business. This is a concern that is rife amongst 
proponents of freely available APIs. This is so because APIs, due to their function of 
allowing different programs to call on each other and thereby facilitating the creation 
and functioning of interconnected networks of applications, are simple but core 
components of all programs. The effects on the greater programming community 
would be disastrous if a single person could have exclusive rights of copyright over an 
API. These considerations are relevant in the South African context as well, though 
the copyright law in South Africa differs slightly.  
Like the USA and the UK, South Africa protects computer programs under the 
law of copyright.225 The implications of the UK finding, were it to be applied in South 
Africa and expressly so in relation to APIs, would be highly beneficial to all persons 
seeking to develop interoperable software. As will be shown, though, the South African 
context demands that there be fair and just treatment of all parties. This includes the 
actual authors of the APIs. The UK position does not wholly benefit the authors of 
computer programs because it does not protect their economic interests in the 
programs that they have developed, in a direct way. In considering what the best 
solution which ought to be taken in South Africa is, it is important to take note of these 
warring interests. 
 
3.4 South Africa 
                                                          
225 Where computer programs are incorporated into an invention, the law of patents may be applicable, but 
discussion of that possibility is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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3.4.1 Summary of South African Approach 
The SA Copyright Act provides sui generis protection for computer programs. This 
includes the literal components of a computer program.226 There have been signs in 
South African case law of an acknowledgment of the copyrightability of the non-literal 
components of a computer program227; however, there is yet to be a definite decision 
by any court. In relation to APIs, this question is yet to be posed at all. It is for this 
reason that this paper seeks to determine what the position in relation ought to be, 
with consideration to the USA and UK approaches as described above, and in light of 
the legal and policy considerations relevant in the South African landscape. 
 
3.4.2 The Constitutional Context 
The starting point of any discussion that concerns legislation, its interpretation and any 
potential development thereof is the Constitution.228 This is evident in its own text, as 
well as the dicta set in prior cases.  
One of the founding values of South Africa is the supremacy of the 
Constitution.229 Of all the different types of laws at play in South Africa – statutory, 
customary and common laws – the Constitution reigns supreme.230 This means that it 
is imperative that the obligations imposed by the Constitution be fulfilled; any law or 
actions which contradict it are invalid.231 
The state is obligated to respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights set out in 
the Bill of Rights, as it is the ‘cornerstone of democracy’ in South Africa.232 The Bill of 
Rights applies to all law and binds all organs and subjects of the state.233 It is trite that 
any interpretation and development of the law in any of its forms must promote the 
spirit, purport and object of the Bill of Rights.234 This entrenches the status of the 
Constitution as the supreme law of the land, and the Bill of Rights as a focal point of 
                                                          
226 See SA Copyright Act note 41, s(1)(1). 
227 See Ncube op cit note 9 at 442; Pastel supra note 25. 
228 Constitution op cit note 56. 
229 Ibid, s1(c). 
230 Ibid, s2. 
231 Ibid. 
232 Ibid, s7(1) – (2). 
233 Ibid, s8(1). 
234 Ibid, s39(2). 
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reference when the law is considered. Various cases have developed precedent over 
time which supports these assertions which cannot be derogated from. In the seminal 
case S v Makwanyane235 Mokgoro J stated that: 
‘The Constitution makes it particularly imperative for the courts to develop the entrenched 
fundamental rights in terms of a cohesive set of values, ideal to an open and democratic society. 
To this end, common values of human rights protection the world over and foreign precedent may 
be instructive.’236 
It was Rabie CJ in University of Cape Town v Cape Bar Council237 who held 
that, when interpreting legislation, the court is compelled to examine the entire context 
in ascertaining the intention of the legislature, regardless of whether the text of the 
legislation is ambiguous or not. It is a truth of the modern constitutional dispensation 
that the Constitution has ‘changed the context of legal thought and decision-making in 
South Africa’.238 That is to say, when interpreting any legislation (or developing the 
law), the first point which an adjudicator is compelled to think carefully about is the 
background of rights and considerations contained in the Constitution. 
 
3.4.3 Analysis of Current Legal Position and Proposal for Improved Approach 
The body of case law in South Africa is scant. In Haupt v Brewer239, the court dealt 
with the general criteria which render a computer program eligible for copyright, and 
distinguished the computer program from other works involved in the overall make-up 
of the computer software (including preparatory materials which were correctly found 
to be literary works). However, consideration of the effects of the non-literal aspects 
of a computer program on its eligibility for copyright are lacking. Even though South 
Africa’s sui generis categorisation of computer programs may limit the persuasive 
value of the foreign jurisdictions, they are still instructive as there is no other guidance 
available locally.240 
                                                          
235 S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC). 
236 Ibid para 302. 
237 University of Cape Town v Cape Bar Council 1986 (2) ALL SA 619 (A). 
238 As stated by Cameron J in Holomisa v Argus Newspapers Ltd 1996 (2) SA 588 (W) at 618. 
239 Haupt op cit note 23. 
240 Ncube op cit note 9 at 442. 
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The running theme throughout this paper is the ideas-expression dichotomy 
and the need to differentiate between ideas and expressions when dealing with the 
non-literal elements of a computer program – specifically the API. The decision in 
Oracle 1 mirrors the finding in SAS to the extent that both judgments held that 
functionality cannot be copyrightable. While the SAS position is of particularly wide 
ambit as it blandly covers all computer programs, the court in Oracle 1 was more 
nuanced in that it specifically addressed APIs in holding that tweaks and 
improvements to the structure and workings of an API have the effect of improving 
efficiency. As such, the space for creative expression in APIs is very limited because 
all developments and modifications in structure are primarily functional and not 
expressive. 
Even the Federal Court in Oracle 2 is in agreement with the court a quo that 
functional aspects of an API will not be eligible for copyright. The difference, of course, 
is that the judge in Oracle 2 is not of the view that the non-literal elements of an API 
will be purely functional in all instances. The possibility of expression in the API render 
it copyrightable. At first glance, this latter view may be appropriate in the South African 
context. The Constitution demands fair and equal treatment of all persons.241 It also 
provides that the owners of property may not be arbitrarily deprived thereof.242 This 
means that the law may not operate to deprive persons of their property. It has already 
been established that intellectual property falls into the ambit of this constitutional 
protection.243 Furthermore, the justifications discussed in Chapter 2 compel us to give 
due consideration to the economic interests of the author of the work, notwithstanding 
the fact that the copyright owner of a computer program is not always the author.244  
Of course, it is also true that the Constitution limits the very rights that it protects, in 
order to put into effect a proportional and just balance between the interests of affected 
                                                          
241 Constituition op cit note 56, s8(1).  
242 Ibid, s25(1). 
243 AJ Van der Walt & RM Shay ‘Constitutional Analysis of Intellectual Property’ (2014) 17 Potchefstroom 
Electronic Law Journal 54 at 56 -57. 




parties.245 This means that copyright owners in APIs are not due an unfettered right to 
their works.246  
The protection of copyright is not justified where its effect is to stunt innovation 
and creativity in the community. It makes no sense, therefore, to provide exclusive 
rights in a function, method or structure in a manner that produces this undesirable 
consequence. This background must be kept in mind in the consideration of whether 
the non-literal components of an API should be copyrightable. What is significant about 
APIs in the context of copyrightability is that they are computer programs which are 
primarily designed to achieve the simple function of interoperability. It is the case that 
in the USA interoperability is a factor in the question of fair use; but South Africa is not 
hamstrung by the precedent of the USA. As such, I submit that the fact that these 
programs are singularly designed to perform this sole function is an important 
consideration to note. 
This consideration leads, as it did in SAS and Oracle 1, to a firm conclusion that 
there is little space for creative expression in the design of an API. All alterations, 
additions and variations to the structure and overall organisation of an API are 
ultimately utilitarian. Indeed, it may take a creative and insightful developer to find the 
best structural arrangement to achieve the desired result, but nevertheless, her 
decisions will be based on the need to improve the program’s efficiency and 
effectiveness. It has been repeated many times in this paper that copyright law does 
not protect that which is functional. The realms of patent, trademark247 and, to an 
extent, designs law248 protect functional creations. From a legal standpoint, I submit 
that there is no basis for copyright to attach to functional elements of an API.  
The economic and social impacts are also important. The effect on the public if 
functionality could, in circumstances, be eligible for copyright, is discussed in the 
UK.249 It is found that the possibility of exclusive ownership in non-literal components 
would be detrimental to innovation.250 This is a powerful observation. If a person is 
                                                          
245 Constitution op cit note 56, s36. 
246 This position is the same in the USA. John Cady op cit note 224 at 18, states: ‘… it is necessary to balance a 
complex system of needs: the author's need for incentives to creativity and the public's needs both for access 
to the fruits of the author's endeavour and for protection against monopoly.’ 
247 Trademarks Act 194 of 1993. 
248 Designs Act 195 of 1993. 
249 SAS supra note 30. 
250 Ibid para 31. 
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seeking protection in the market at the level offered by patent rights, the person should 
take the avenues provided by patent protection. These are much more difficult to 
satisfy than the paths of eligibility for copyright. This is fair, considering the fact that 
the exclusive power sought creates an extremely high bar to market entry for 
competitors and casual persons seeking to innovate. APIs allow for the efficient 
functioning of networks of computer programs. All of the benefits that computer 
software brings to society are made possible by APIs. They are critical pieces of 
software, without which modern advancements would slow to a crippling rate. The 
negative effect is similar if only a core group of developers have exclusive rights over 
APIs. On this basis, I submit their use to society as a whole is of greater importance 
than the interests that a few copyright owners may have in filling their pockets. 
It is not fair to grant the minority excessive and exclusive rights which are 
disproportionately easy to obtain in comparison to the level of control and potential 
market share that they grant the rights owner, at the expense of the community at 
large. Rather, functional tools such as APIs should not be capable of copyright 
eligibility, on grounds of policy and practicality; and with due regard to the legal 
analysis. 
  
CHAPTER 4: API’S AND EXCEPTIONS TO INFRINGEMENT 
 
4.1 Introduction 
There are exceptions to copyright infringement. This means that, in certain cases 
defined or designated in each jurisdiction, a person who would otherwise be liable for 
copyright infringement is exempted from such liability on the basis of a lawful 
exception. The USA differs from South Africa and the UK which employ fair dealing. 
In the USA, courts determine whether otherwise infringing conduct may be exempted 
from liability by considering whether the conduct constitutes a fair use of the 
copyrighted work or not.251 
                                                          
251 See O’Donnell op cit note 60 at 621. 
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Fair use acts as a defence where the infringing act is deemed to satisfy certain 
criteria which render it a lawful use of the copyright work.252 The Federal Court in 
Oracle 2253 had an opportunity to consider some points relating to fair use and API’s. 
Though it did not come to a decision, opting rather to send the question of fair use 
back to the court a quo pending further evidence from both parties, its explanation and 
interpretation of the criteria in relation to APIs offers some insight. In South Africa and 
the UK, on the other hand, there is a closed list of exceptions to infringement. This is 
known as fair dealing. The fair dealing doctrine has been described as:  
‘a key part of the social bargain at the heart of copyright law, in which as a society we concede 
certain limited individual property rights to ensure the benefits of creativity to a living culture … 
[and] is more important today than ever before.’254  
This Chapter will analyse the USA and UK position on exceptions in relation to 
computer programs, with a specific focus on the implications on APIs, and present the 
South African a proposal on what the South African position ought to be with regards 
to APIs. 
 
4.2 Alternative Mechanism: Reverse Engineering 
Reverse engineering includes the attempt to reverse the steps in making a program in 
order to uncover the source code version of a program from its object code.255 This is 
so because users who need to study the structure and technical parameters of an 
existing program can only do so once they have accessed the program in its source 
code form.256 A person may make use of various methods of reverse engineering 
which include analysing screen displays of object code, or decompilation or 
disassembly of the program.257 
                                                          
252 Jacqueline Litpon ‘The Law of Unintended Consequences: The Digital Millenium Copyright Act and 
Interoperability’ (2005) 62 Washington and Lee Law Review 487 at 532. 
253 Oracle Appeal supra note 7. 
254 Association of Independent Video and Filmmakers (ANF) et al., ‘Documentary Filmmakers' Statement of 
Best Practices in Fair Use’ available at http://centerforsocialmedia.org/files/pdf/fair-use-final.pdf accessed on 
12 February 2018. 
255 McManis op cit note 13 at 29. 
256 Ibid.  
257 Ibid at 29. 
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Section 107 of the US Copyright Act permits the fair use of person’s copyrighted 
work.258 This permits all forms of reverse engineering, so long as they are deemed to 
be fair, to be a means of ‘obtaining access to the unprotected ideas’259 found in a 
publicly distributed computer program.260 One may also engage in reverse analysis of 
a computer program where it is an essential step in the utilisation of that program.261 
Reverse engineering is provided for in the European Union. The EC Directive provides 
that: 
‘[A] person having a right to use a copy of a computer program shall be entitled, without the 
authorization of the [copylrightholder, to observe, study or test the functioning of the program 
in order to determine the ideas and principles which underlie any element of the program if he 
does so while performing any of the acts of loading, displaying, running, transmitting or storing 
the program which he is entitled to do.’262 
Furthermore, the EC Directive permits decompilation or disassembly where 
they are necessary to ‘achieve the interoperability of an independently created 
computer program with other programs’, subject to conditions.263 
As mentioned above, reverse engineering is permitted in both the USA and the 
UK. The advantage of reverse engineering is that it allows a person to figure out the 
workings of a program by creating her own source code after disassembling the object 
code of the respective program. It is limited, however, in that it puts a person in the 
position where she is still forced to create her own API, which is inefficient and time 
consuming. It does little to subvert the disadvantage one faces in having to create 
one’s own API ‘from the ground up’, as it were. The user remains restricted from using 
the API.264 Nevertheless, to permit reverse engineering is a progressive step and one 
that provides developers with an opportunity to innovate. It would certainly find useful 
application in the South African context.  
                                                          
258 Ibid at 45. 
259 Ibid. 
260 Ibid, as found in Games Corp. v. Nintendo of America supra note 165, and Sega Enterprises, Ltd. 
v. Accolade, Inc. supra note 138. 
261 US Copyright Act op cit note 43, s117, as interpreted per McManis op cit note 13 at 45. 
262 EC, Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the 
harmonization of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, [2001] O.J.L. 167, 
Article 5(3). 
263 Ibid, Article 6. 
264 John T. Soma, Gus Weinfeld & Letty Freinsein ‘Software Interoperability and Reverse Engineering’ (1994) 20 
Rutgers Technology and Law Journal 189  at 239. 
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What follows is an analysis of the general fair use and fair dealing doctrines as 
used in the USA and the UK respectively. 
 
4.3 United States of America 
 
4.3.1  Summary of USA Approach 
It is possible for a defendant to argue that her use of an API over which she lacks the 
requisite ownership rights or permission from the copyright owner is excepted from 
constituting a copyright infringement. Said defendant must prove that the use qualifies 
as a fair use.  
As the law stands after the finding in Oracle 2, courts will consider the 
interoperability function of APIs, amongst other factors, as being favourable towards 
a determination that the use is fair.265 This is so because interoperability is a core 
component of programming, necessary to allow different programs to work in sync 
without individual programmers having to develop entire lines of code to perform tasks 
which existing programs already perform. Fair use has its disadvantages, however, as 
it is unpredictable: if a copyright owner can prove that the defendant’s use reduces the 
market share of the copyright owner, a court may find that the use is not fair.266  
Ultimately, the decision of each court will differ on a case-by-case basis. The 
same facts in one matter may foreseeably yield different results in another matter. 
Such uncertainty offers little relief for parties that may seek to use APIs but lack the 
financial security to entertain the threat of litigation. As such, the practical effects of 
the fair use treatment of APIs may result in reduced innovation as small players seek 
to avoid threats against their business by removing existing APIs that they may be 
using in the development of their programs, and resisting future use of the same 
altogether. 
The fair use doctrine is explained in greater detail below, as well as the manner 
in which it may affect APIs. 
                                                          
265 Oracle Appeal supra note 7 at 45. 
266 See comments on unpredictable nature of Fair Use in section 4.3.5 of this paper. 
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4.3.2 Fair Use Doctrine 
The USA is hailed as the most progressive jurisdiction for being flexible in its approach 
to exceptions to infringement, as it makes use of the fair use doctrine which is arguably 
the ideal model for copyright law.267 Fair use is simply an open list of uses which may 
be permissible if found to be fair.268 The factors considered to determine fairness will 
appear from the case discussion below of the Federal Court’s judgment in Oracle 2.  
 
4.3.3 Oracle v Google 2 
 
4.3.3.1 Summary of Findings 
Given that the Federal Court found that the JAVA API was eligible for copyright, it 
turned its focus to the question of whether Google’s use could be excepted from 
infringement on the basis of fair use. Ultimately, the court stayed from making a 
decision as it found that insufficient evidence had been tendered.269 Nevertheless, its 
discussion of the law is of aid in the considerations to come relating to the South 
African context. 
 
4.3.3.2   Case Discussion of Fair Use 
The court began its discussion on fair use with reference to the US Copyright Act. It 
provides that works that are protected under copyright may be used for criticism, 
comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship or research.270 As has been made 
clear, this does not constitute a numerous clausus of categories of uses which may be 
fair.271 
                                                          
267 See D'Agostino note 59 at 344. 
268 Ibid. 
269 A jury for the district court did find that there was fair use during a new trial initiated after Google’s 
application for an appeal against the judgment of the Federal Court had been rejected by the Supreme Court. 
The views on fair use as expressed by the judge in Oracle 2 are considered in this paper as they shed more light 
on the treatment of fair use than the vote of the jury in the subsequent district court trial. 
270 US Copyright Act op cit note 43, s107. 
271 For instance, fair use for reverse engineering is favoured in the USA – see McManis op cit note 13 at 27. 
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In order to determine if one of these uses is fair or not, four factors must be 
considered on a case-by-case basis.272 These factors are instructive as to the 
considerations that South African courts may make when determining if a permissible 
use is fair or not. The court listed the factors as they appear in the US Copyright Act:  
‘(1) “the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature 
or is for non-profit educational purposes;” (2) “the nature of the copyrighted work;” (3) “the 
amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole;” 
and (4) “the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.’273 
The court noted that all of the factors must be considered and weighed against 
each other, and reflected upon in light of the purpose of copyright in the USA which is 
to promote the ‘[P]rogress of Science and useful Arts’.274  
It noted the general principles of the fair use doctrine in relation to the factors. 
The first factor revolves around the purpose and character of the use. This includes 
whether the use is of a commercial nature or whether it is for non-profit educational 
purposes. This factor is split into two considerations: whether, and the extent that, the 
work is transformative and whether its use is commercial or not. The court supported 
the view that a work will only be transformative where the copyrighted work is changed, 
or where the copyrighted work is used in a new context such that the copyrighted work 
is effectively a new creation.275 A work will not be transformative if it makes no change 
to the expressive content [emphasised by the court] of the original work.276 As regards 
the question of commercial use, such use weakens an argument for fair use.277 
The court found that the second factor recognises that certain works are ‘closer 
to the core of intended copyright protection.’278 This means that there are certain works 
for which copyright protection is robust and limitations thereof are scarcely applicable. 
The court stated that the question of whether fair use has been established or not will 
                                                          
272 Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 549 (1985). 
273 Oracle Appeal supra note 7 at 54, quoting US Copyright Act op cit note 43, s107. 
274 United States of America: Constitution,  17 September 1787, Article 1(8)(8); Ibid, as found in Campbell v. 
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994) at 575, 578. 
275 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007) at 1164 where the court states: ‘A work is 
"transformative" when the new work does not "merely supersede the objects of the original creation" but 
rather "adds something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new 
expression, meaning or message.’ 
276 Oracle Appeal supra note 7 at 57. 
277 Ibid. 
278 Ibid at 57 – 58. 
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turn on whether the work is of an informational or creative nature. It is creative 
expression which falls centrally into the protective aims of copyright law.’279 This is 
appropriate to computer programs in general, and APIs specifically, because fair use 
is likely to be applicable where purely functional elements exist in the work and the 
expressive elements must be copied in order to perform the function.280 
The third factor calls for a consideration of the amount of the original work which 
was copied; considered from the perspective of the original work, and not of how much 
of the infringing copy consists of the original work. Complete copying does not, 
however, automatically defeat fair use. If the person who copies only copies inasmuch 
as is necessary to achieve the intended function, then the copying will not render the 
use unfair.281 
Finally, fair use may not materially impair the potential market for the original 
copy. The importance of this factor is great, but varies with consideration of the other 
factors weighing on its significance.282 As stated by the Supreme Court in Campbell283, 
courts must not only consider the extent of the market harm caused by the 
infringement, but also whether or not unrestricted conduct like that engaged in by the 
defendant would substantially prejudice the potential market of the original copyright 
owner.284 
The court found that interoperability is a relevant consideration with regards to the 
second and third factors. It stated that, in relation to the core packages of the JAVA 
API, the functional necessity implicated by interoperability is in favour of fair use.285 
 
4.3.4 Implications of Fair Use Treatment 
Though the Federal Court withheld from making a final decision as to fair use in this 
case, its considerations are telling. Its discussion confirms that it is possible for a 
defendant to use fair use as a defence for copyright infringement of an API. It also 
                                                          
279 Ibid. 
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281 Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 820-21 (9th Cir. 2003). 
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confirms the importance of the interoperability function of APIs in support of an 
argument that the use of APIs should qualify as fair use. No single factor or sub-factor 
is likely to be a deciding factor on its own; however, the function that APIs serve is so 
crucial and cannot be divorced from their expressive aspects. It is likely, then, that 
exploiting APIs will, in most circumstances, qualify as fair use. It is also likely that the 
detrimental effects on the market of the owner of the APIs in any given circumstance 
may lead the court to conclude that use of the APIs cannot be fair. This will differ per 
the varying facts of each case. Nevertheless, the Oracle case gives rise to the 
conclusion that it is likely that persons who make use of the APIs of others may not 
attract legal liability. 
The manner in which courts in the USA have dealt with fair use seems steeped 
in a capitalism-centric incentivisation justification for copyright protection, though its 
doctrine also places emphasis on creativity.286 So long as a user of a copyrighted work 
does not prejudice the market share of the owner of the copyright, and the use is 
minimal (in relation to its importance to the original work), then the use may be fair. 
Even so, a court may always rule in the opposite way. 
The implications of this ruling also attract policy considerations which demand 
attention in any discussion of the approach which ought to be taken in South Africa. 
The possibility that developers may deal with APIs using the doctrine of fair use does 
not offer the kind of legal certainty that allows business – especially small enterprises 
with scant financial clout – to act without concern.287 Applications and programs which 
are already in existence and make use of the APIs of third parties may have to be 
redesigned in order to ensure that their developers are protected from legal liability.288 
This is so because not everyone can afford to engage in judicial matters in order to 
argue that their use of any respective API is fair. The irony which attaches to the 
uncertainty of fair use is that innovation will inevitably be hindered.  
                                                          
286 See USA Constitution op cit note 166. 
287 See Lloyd L. Weinreb ‘Fair Use’ (1999) 67 Fordham Law Review 1291 at 1291 where he quotes from Folsom 
v Marsh 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901). Which states that fair use is: one of those intricate and 
embarrassing questions... in which it is not... easy to arrive at any satisfactory conclusion, or to lay down any 
general principles applicable to all cases.’; O’Donnell note 60 at 58. 
288 See section 4.3.1 of this paper where the manner in which the fear of litigation may dispel companies from 
using APIs is noted. 
62 
 
On the opposite end of the spectrum, a person with copyright ownership of an 
API may welcome the fact that they have rights in a work over which they have 
expended their efforts and intellect to create. Due to the fact that fairness is determined 
on a case-by-case basis, it is arguable that a court will necessarily make 
considerations which have a balanced effect on both the plaintiff and the defendant in 
such matters. This does not resolve the issue that the uncertainty may have a deterring 
effect on third-parties that would otherwise seek to use APIs to spur their own 
innovation. Nevertheless, it seems to be the best option in the event where APIs are 
found to be eligible for copyright. 
 
4.4 United Kingdom 
 
4.4.1 Summary of UK Approach 
The fair dealing doctrine is applied in the United Kingdom. It is a closed list of uses 
which are eligible for determination as to whether they are fair or not.  
There has been no decision regarding APIs and their applicability to this 
exception, as is made clear below, but the doctrine as applied in the UK Copyright Act 
does not support a case for use of APIs being fair. This is contrary to the USA 
approach, and it is much less flexible and capable of keeping pace with the rapidly 
changing times. The fair dealing doctrine as applied in the UK is canvassed in greater 
detail below. 
 
4.4.2 Fair Dealing Doctrine 
There is no case which considers fair dealing in relation to APIs, which is sensible as 
the only matters to deal with the copyrightability of computer programs have already 
established that the functional aspects of a computer program are not copyrightable.289 
Nevertheless, computer programs are treated as a specie of literary work in the UK, 
and the UK Copyright Act provides for fair dealing in respect of such works, among 
others. 
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Due to the latter, and because the UK system pertaining to the fair dealing 
doctrine is similar to that which is employed in South Africa, the treatment of fair 
dealing in the UK is illustrative and of guidance. 
In order for a use to be considered fair dealing, it must fall into one of the 
categories set in the UK Copyright Act for fair dealing, as well as be fair and, in some 
cases, include acknowledgement of the author of the original work.290 The UK 
Copyright Act provides that use for the purposes of research or private study does not 
infringe copyright291; neither does it infringe for the purposes of criticism and review, 
nor when reporting current events.292 Exceptions also include for education293 as well 
as anything done pursuant to parliamentary or judicial proceedings.294 The South 
African law of copyright operates with a similar limited set of permissible uses, barring 
the exception on reverse engineering, so the manner in which the UK courts approach 
this challenge is relevant as it sheds light on the possibility of the availability of 
opportunities to use computer programs lawfully. 
 
4.4.2.1 Permissible Uses in Fair Dealing 
Due to the fact that the list of categories of acceptable dealing is closed, the judiciary 
has opted to take a liberal approach in determining which uses are apt for 
consideration under the fair dealing doctrine.295 This means that the courts do not, 
where possible, follow a strict interpretation of the provisions relating to fair dealing. 
They interpret the provisions in such a way so as to allow as many different kinds of 
uses of copyrighted works to be included in the fair dealing exceptions, so long as the 
respective courts consider these uses to be acceptable. Nevertheless, the scope of 
their interpretive powers is severely limited.  
The closed list of categories of acceptable uses presents a monumental 
problem for the person seeking to make use of a computer program such as an API in 
order to enable, for instance, interoperability between different programs. Such a 
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291 UK Copyright Act op cit note 53, s29(1). 
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person will need to frame their use of the API in a manner which can be categorised 
as one of the acceptable uses. This is a problem commonly raised amongst those who 
criticise the fair dealing doctrine; it is a problem not encountered in the US system 
because the fair use doctrine allows an infinite number of uses to qualify under the 
protection of its exceptions, so long as they are found to be fair.296 As South Africa 
also employs the fair dealing system, similar problems are foreseeable in relation to 
computer programs. This is the case even more so because computer programs are 
not treated as literary works in South Africa, and consequently are able to only benefit 
from a shorter list of exceptions than literary works.  
If the respective work does happen to fall under one of the enumerated 
categories, the court will determine its fairness using considerations as introduced in 
Hubbard.297 In this matter, where the court determined whether the use of a book 
which relied extensively on the book of another author was fair or not, the court stated: 
‘It is impossible to define what is 'fair dealing'. It must be a question of degree. You must 
consider first the number and extent of the quotations and extracts. Are they altogether too 
many and too long to be fair? Then you must consider the use made of them. … [i]f they are 
used to convey the same information as the author for a rival purpose, that may be unfair. Next, 
you must consider the proportions … after all is said and done, it must be a matter of 
impression.’298 
 
4.4.2.2 Factors of Fairness 
Judicial application of these principles has yielded factors which bare a marked 
resemblance to the considerations made under the doctrine of fair use in the USA. 
These include not only the nature of the work, but also the manner in which the work 
was obtained; the amount taken; the degree of transformation of the use; whether the 
new work has been used for a commercial benefit or not; the motives behind and 
consequences of the dealing; and whether alternatives existed.299 
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299 See Healing note 59 at 342 – 343. 
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In Ashdown v Telegraph300, where a daily newspaper published confidential 
political material which related to the pending formation of a new government in the 
UK and claimed that it was not liable for copyright infringement on the basis of fair 
dealing, Aldous J provided that the standard to be applied in weighing the factors of 
fairness is that of a fair minded and honest person. 
The range of options that were available to the author in creating the work is 
also used to determine whether the work can be lawfully used or not. This appears in 
both the UK and the USA approaches. If the developer of an API creates a structure 
and organisation where she had multiple alternative options that she could have 
exploited to yield her intended result, it is highly unlikely use of her API will be fair. 
The UK approach, not unlike the USA approach, also places great weight on 
the mindset or intentions of the user. This is evident in that the court must interpret the 
situation through the lens of a ‘fair minded and honest’ person. Nevertheless, the fair 
dealing doctrine does not create a favourable legal avenue for users of APIs.  
 
4.4.3 Implications of Fair Dealing Doctrine 
 
The implications of the fair dealing doctrine as applied in the UK on those who would 
seek to benefit from advances in technology do not appear to be entirely beneficial. 
Indeed, one of the biggest criticisms of fair dealing is its apparent inability to evolve 
and adopt solutions to copyright problems caused as a result of technological 
progress.301  
For example, in Australia it was not considered fair dealing to use a VCR in 
order to record television at one’s home because the Australian fair dealing categories 
did not accommodate this technology. It was only in 2006 that the legislature enacted 
                                                          
300 Ashdown v. Telegraph Group Ltd., (2001) EWCA Civ 1142; O'Donnell op cit note 60 at 63. 
301 Nicolas Suzor ‘Fair Use v Fair Dealing: How Australian Copyright Law Differs’ available at 
https://www.lifehacker.com.au/2017/07/fair-use-vs-fair-dealing-how-australian-copyright-law-differs/ 
accessed on 12 February 2018. 
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the Copyright Amendment Act302 which cured this issue. By this time, of course, VCRs 
were well on their way to being relics of the past.303 
The inability to accommodate technological progress is made further evident 
due to the fact that the available categories for fair dealing in the UK are of little aid to 
users of computer programs. The categories cater to those dealing in traditional 
literary works, such as books and works of art. At its most progressive, the list includes 
parodies, which could implicate cinematographic works or other modern creations.  
It seems clear, then, that the intention of the legislature in the UK was to ensure 
that the balancing of the interests of the copyright owner of a computer program and 
third-party users was to be put into effect only at the stage of the copyright eligibility 
enquiry. The only avenue through which users of computer programs could hope to 
gain entry would be, as discussed above, through the exception which relates to 
private research or study, or reverse engineering, which is of limited scope as it is a 
right to decompile for the purpose of understanding, rather than a right to use the 
computer program. Overall, it seems that fair dealing in the UK does not accommodate 
those who seek to make use of computer programs without being required to pay the 
owner of the copyright in the work. 
This assessment seems not to bode well for users in the South African context. 
The SA Copyright Act does, however, contain key differences to the UK Copyright Act. 
These stem from the fact that computer programs in South Africa constitute their own 
separate work. This means that the considerations which underlie the UK position will 
be different in South Africa. Furthermore, the legal contexts in the two jurisdictions 
make it reasonably possible to foresee that the results reached in South Africa may 
differ markedly.  
What follows is a consideration of the potential South African approach. A 
proposal is then put forward as to what the approach in South Africa should be in 
relation to APIs. 
 
4.5 South Africa 
                                                          
302 Copyright Amendment Act 158 of 2006. 
303 Suzor op cit note 301. 
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4.5.1 Summary of South African Approach 
It is within the spectrum of possibilities that the judiciary in South Africa will find that 
APIs may be eligible for copyright, like the Federal Court in Oracle 2. This gives rise 
to the second issue of whether a user may have a defence against an infringement 
claim by making use of the doctrine of fair dealing. 
I have argued that the SA Copyright Act makes use of a fair dealing exception 
which is not inclusive of computer programs in any way that is practically beneficial to 
an API user. There is a slim opportunity created by an exception for quotations; 
however, no ruling yet exists in relation to such an exception and computer programs, 
and it is unlikely that any such ruling would offer erstwhile freedom to API users. The 
Copyright Bill, however, seems progressive and almost constitutionally satisfactory. 
Its introduction in South African law, subject to certain linguistic changes to its content, 
will be fair to both API users as well as copyright owners. 
 
4.5.2 Constitutional Context 
The supremacy of the Constitution has already been underlined. All considerations of 
what the law is, and what it should be, must be coloured by the contents and intents 
of the Constitution. This is all the more relevant considering that the SA Copyight Bill 
remains, at the time of writing, under discussion. The UK approach has revealed some 
of the difficulties of fair dealing. This Copyright Bill creates an opportunity for some of 
those issues to be resolved, and should include improvements that fulfil the spirit and 
purport of the Bill of Rights (specifically, for the purposes of this paper, in relation to 
computer programs). These improvements can be designed to be of benefit to all 
parties involved with APIs – from the copyright owner to the prospective users. 
What follows is a discussion of the Copyright Bill and an analysis of the foreign 
law treatment of exceptions to copyright infringement. Finally, I will assess the 
shortfalls and opportunities of the current fair dealing regime in South Africa insofar as 
it relates to computer programs, specifically with regards to APIs, and I will issue 
proposals for a fair and balanced solution. 
 
4.5.3 Discussion of South African Copyright Bill 
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 The Copyright Bill introduces a ‘fair use’ clause which is in actual fact a fair dealing 
clause as the list of permissible uses remains closed.304 To this end, it has been 
suggested that the clause should introduce its list of permissible uses with the phrase 
‘such as’, so as to leave the list of uses open and thus make the provision one of fair 
use.305 This would go some way to resolve the issues of restrictive application 
discussed above in relation to the fair dealing clauses. Nevertheless, the Copyright 
Bill does introduce some protection that the SA Copyright Act does not afford users of 
computer programs.  
It also bears to note that it completely replaces the provisions in section 19B of 
the SA Copyright Act306, which means that computer programs may not be used for 
criticism, review, judicial proceedings, illustration, demonstration, broadcasting, or 
quotations.307 Any of the new fair dealing additions of section 12 of the SA Copyright 
do not apply to computer programs in the Copyright Bill. Section 19B of the Copyright 
Bill provides: 
‘(1) A person having a right to use a copy of a computer program may, without the authorisation 
of the rights holder, observe, study or test the functioning of the program in order to determine 
the ideas and principles which underlie any element of the program if that person does so while 
performing any of the acts of loading, displaying, running, transmitting or storing the program 
which he or she is entitled to perform.’ 
This is the introduction of an exception for reverse-engineering as well as the 
decompilation of software308 akin to that which is found in the USA and the UK. The 
Copyright Bill also provides that interoperability may render a use fair, subject to 
certain conditions: 
‘(2) The authorisation of the rights holder shall not be required where reproduction of the code 
and translation of its form are indispensable in order to obtain the information necessary to 
achieve the interoperability of an independently created computer program with other 
programs, if …: 
(a) The acts referred to in subsection (1) are performed by the licensee or another person 
having a right to use a copy of the program, or on their behalf by a person authorised to do so; 
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306 Copyright Bill op cit note 67, s17. 
307 The Anton Mostert Chair of Intellectual Property Commentary on the Copyright Amendment Bill 2017 




 (b) the information necessary to achieve interoperability has not previously been readily 
available to the persons referred to in paragraph (a); and 
(c) those acts are confined to the parts of the original program which are necessary in order to 
achieve interoperability. 
The Copyright Bill appears to be a saving grace for users of computer 
programs. It permits specific usage in a manner that is much more inclusive and 
flexible than the SA Copyright Act. Its provisions mean that, in a case involving APIs 
in similar circumstances as in the Oracle matter, the defendant is likely to find relief on 
the basis that APIs enable interoperability (an argument which was considered 
favourably in Oracle 2). It does not defeat the rights of the copyright owner, either, as 
the set limitations which apply to it protect the copyright owner from undue competition. 
‘(3) The information obtained through the application of the provisions of subsection (2) may 
not be— 
(a) used for goals other than those to achieve the interoperability of the independently created 
computer program; 
(b) given to others except when necessary for the interoperability of the independently created 
computer program; 
(c) used for the development, production or marketing of a computer program substantially 
similar in its expression to the program contemplated in subsection (1); or 
(d) used for any other act which infringes copyright.’ 
Criticism of this provision has been levelled, though. The word ‘interoperability’ 
is defined in the Bill as the ‘ability to exchange information and to use the information 
which has been exchanged’.309 It has been argued that this definition is 
counterproductive because the inter-operation of computer programs does not 
necessarily occur in a reciprocal manner.310 In other words, at times, computer 
programs do not exchange information when operating in tandem: interoperability can 
occur where the flow of information goes in one direction, from one program to the 
next. It has been suggested that the definition of ‘interoperability’ as it applies in this 
                                                          
309 Copyright Bill op cit note 67, s19B(4). 
310 CIP op cit note 307 at 32. 
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provision should be ‘the ability [of a program] to perform its function in concert with 
another program or programs.’311  
As it stands, however, the implication of the definition of ‘interoperability’ 
creates the risk that certain uses of APIs may not qualify as an exception based on 
interoperability because a program in an inter-operational pair makes use of the API 
to call on information from the other program, but does not relay information to the 
other program in reciprocal exchange. This would arbitrarily undermine the positive 
intention behind section 19B. 
Secondly, criticism has been levelled at the decompilation exception which 
applies only to those parts of the computer program which are necessary to achieve 
interoperability.312 This criticism arises because, in reality, decompilation of the entire 
program must occur before the specific parts which are needed may be identified.313 
This means that the provision as it stands may contradict itself in that it permits 
decompilation but the manner in which the exception it creates has been framed 
makes its application practically impossible. 
The Copyright Bill removes uses that are tied to literary works and artistic works 
in favour of creating a specific exception applicable to computer programs. This 
exception is progressive in that it places great weight in the functionality of a computer 
program in determining whether use of it would be fair or not. This is particularly useful 
in the case of APIs because of the fact that the functionality of an API is deeply integral 
to its existence, as well as to the efficient functioning of software in general. It creates 
opportunities for third-party users to use APIs in the same manner that Google did in 
the Oracle case. It means that the user of an API is likely to find relief through this 
exception. 
Barring its definitional issues, and the fact that it renders the rest of the section 
12 exceptions inapplicable in relation to computer programs, it seems that section 19B 
of the Copyright Bill has real potential to effectively create a balance between copyright 
exceptions and limitations thereof. 
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4.5.4 Proposal for Improved South African Approach 
Much has been said in this paper of the approaches in the USA and the UK. They 
have been used to show the benefits and shortcomings of the fair use and fair dealing 
doctrines respectively.  
What is to be taken from the analysis of the positions taken in foreign law? The 
answer is that fair dealing as applied in the UK is an inadequate solution to problems 
in the ever-developing world of computer technology. It operates to protect the 
interests of the copyright owner to the detriment of everyone else. It harms innovation 
in that it provides developers with little options to work with, other than submitting to 
the demands of the copyright owner. The legal certainty created by the predictability 
of fair dealing is grossly outweighed by its imbalanced, restrictive application. The 
position in the SA Copyright Act is no different. It offers little opportunity for APIs to 
qualify as a permissible use. Until a judicial determination is made regarding the 
quotations exception and APIs, it merely constitutes a flimsy and narrow bridge to 
cross over the abyss that is infringement. It is unlikely that it is of any use to API users 
seeking to be excepted from liability. 
The USA presents a much better model to be followed in the event that 
programs such as APIs are found to be copyrightable. It is malleable – able to keep 
up with the times and protect users in certain instances. The only weakness of the fair 
use doctrine is that legal certainty is diluted given that judges will determine its 
applicability with regard to the facts of each respective matter. In comparison to the 
issues inherent in the fair dealing doctrine, however, the problem of uncertainty is not 
so large. It is a natural part of the legal order that courts are the final arbiters of justice, 
and so in some circumstances it is inescapable that certain questions must be left to 
the judge. Also, this allows for the protection of the interests of API copyright owners 
as well, thereby creating a fair and balanced system of law. 
Reverse engineering, which is permitted in both jurisdictions, affords the user 
an opportunity to develop their own API in given circumstances as described above. 
Although this does not solve the issue that a user is precluded from making use of an 
existing API as it is, which is a better alternative, the permitting of reverse engineering 
is progressive. It also affords a fairer balance between the rights of the copyright owner 
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and the interests of the user. The copyright owner still has protection over his API, 
while the user may create an API to solve issues of, for example, interoperability. 
Fairness, balance and proportionality of treatment are key values in the 
overarching constitutional context. In this regard, the exceptions in the SA Copyright 
Act are inadequate as they offer no equal treatment. The Copyright Bill, on the other 
hand, combines elements of both the USA and the UK to achieve a considerably 
treatment of the parties involved. This includes the ability of a user to reverse engineer 
computer programs. This is a limited solution on its own, but it is still much better than 
the existing South African provisions. Furthermore, the Copyright Bill permits fair 
dealing strictly where interoperability is the aim of the use. This obviates the issues 
that users face when faced with existing fair dealing provisions, and also protects 
copyright owners because its ambit is narrow so as to prevent abuse of their rights. 
The minor issues related to the definitions used in its exceptions provision need 
resolution as suggested; otherwise, the provision directly gives users of APIs a 
genuine opportunity to innovate without backlash from the law. 
On this basis, I submit that it is advisable that the Copyright Bill exception in relation 
to computer programs apply in South Africa. It grants the courts the opportunity to 
apply the values of the Constitution in each matter as they use it to aid their 
considerations of the issues at hand. The question of fair use relating to APIs in 
particular will not prejudice copyright owners or users. The Copyright Bill secures the 
interests of both parties and is commendable and recommended, subject to revisions 




The technological frontier is developing at a rapid pace. The space occupied by 
software development is expanding at exponentially increasing rates, and APIs are 
fuelling the acceleration. Without APIs, coding would be a tedious, slow activity which 
would require strenuous additional programming for each new service added to a 
piece of software. Now, a programmer can call on a whole host of pre-programmed 
services using APIs, which enables the rapid growth in software development. 
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This speedy progression of technology has brought the age-old friction between 
the law and innovation to the fore: is the law sufficiently developed to cater to new 
issues that have been and are to be created by development and, if not, how should 
the law be formulated or reformulated in order to have the capability of resolving these 
problems? Other, familiar, issues have also been implicated in the debate about 
copyright ownership and APIs, including the threat of monopolies, the threat to 
innovation, the effects on the economy of intellectual property protection, and the ever-
present need to balance the interests of those persons who make the work, with the 
interests of the community. The dichotomy between ideas and expressions in 
copyright has played centre stage on a set comprised of the creative and functional 
components of the non-literal elements of computer programs. 
I have argued that our law will be constitutionally sound should it be developed 
to preclude APIs from eligibility for copyright. Failing this, I have argued that the SA 
Copyright Act needs to be developed so that a flexible fair use provision is incorporated 
into its mechanisms so that a fair balance between the rights of the copyright owner 
and those persons who seek to use APIs in their software development may be 
achieved. This development is aligned with the proposed computer program 
infringement exceptions in the Copyright Bill. These conclusions have been reached 
with due consideration given to the utilitarian justification for copyright protection, as 
well as of the dicta espoused in foreign law jurisdictions – namely, the USA and the 
UK. Analysis of the prevailing law in South Africa has also served to yield direction as 
to the positions which should be taken locally. 
In considering the question of the copyrightability of APIs, the seminal case of 
Oracle in the USA has given two powerful yet contradicting views between the Federal 
Court and the court a quo. The decision of the court a quo has rested on the functional 
aspects of the API. It has found that the non-literal components of an API are so void 
of creativity, due to its utilitarian purpose, that its non-literal components cannot be 
held to constitute an expression. The Federal Court, however, has found its reasoning 
profoundly incorrect and argued rather that the non-literal aspects of the API are 
actually capable of being products of creative input. In the UK, the courts have followed 
the direction set by the EUCJ which has pronounced a blanket ban on the 
copyrightability of the functionality of computer programs. The reasons for this have 
included that the regional enactments do not allow for it; and that such rights would 
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create monopolies for copyright owners that would operate to the detriment of 
innovation. 
In South Africa, it has become clear that no position has been taken on the 
copyrightability of APIs. As of yet, the question of the copyrightability of the non-literal 
components of a computer program, in general, has not been answered. I have 
suggested in this paper that the South African approach should mirror that which is 
favoured in the UK and by the court a quo in the Oracle matter. This is so because 
APIs are purely functional creations developed simply to enable different programs to 
work in tandem. Its utilitarian nature is befitting, at best, of patent protection. 
Ownership rights over APIs cannot be found in the realm of copyright, where creativity, 
not mere functionality, is meant to find encouragement and reward. Finally, the 
detrimental effects on competition and access to the market that will be caused by the 
copyrightability of APIs is yet another nail in the coffin of pro-copyrightability 
arguments. It is important to secure the economic interests of developers in order to 
incentivise them to create these works; however, the cost of granting a broad 
exclusionary right in copyright is too great, and inappropriate. Persons who seek to 
create a monopoly over pieces of technology must be directed to the law of patents, 
where requirements for patentability are more stringent. 
In the alternative, if APIs are found to be eligible for copyright protection, an 
approach similar to the fair use approach used in the USA is most preferred. The fair 
use doctrine has been shown to be flexible and thus able to accommodate the influx 
of issues created by changing technology. In this regard, an opportunity seems to be 
available to those who seek to benefit from the use of APIs. This much is clear from 
the Oracle judgment, where the court has been shown to be in favour of granting a fair 
use right over APIs on the basis of, amongst other things, their ability to facilitate 
interoperability between programs.  
The fair dealing provisions in the UK have expectedly been shown to be highly 
restrictive. Legal certainty created by a limited set of permissible uses is outweighed 
by the fact that in most cases the use of computer programs, no less APIs, will not 
constitute fair dealing. Nevertheless, both the USA and the UK stances are favourable 
to the current South African approach because the reverse engineering of computer 
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software is permitted in those jurisdictions. This allows a programmer to develop her 
own API, if she has the relevant skill and access to resources. 
I have argued that the fair dealing provisions in South Africa are in need of 
improvement. Although the exceptions which relate to quotations might possibly 
provide some semblance of an opportunity for users of APIs (although unlikely), the 
uncertainty related to how a court may interpret the provision, as well as the limited 
range of uses that the provision (and others like it) will create, has lead me to conclude 
that the fair dealing provisions as they are, are inadequate. The Copyright Bill displays 
a significant step towards progressive law that recognises the multitude of uses related 
to computer programs, and the need for such uses to be available to all persons in 
order to spur innovation. It has been shown to have some shortcomings, but marks an 
improvement on the current law. I have argued that the law should be developed in 
keeping with the provisions of the Copyright Bill which relate to computer programs, 
subject to the making of key changes which will enable the provision to be fully 
exploited by users within the bounds of reason. 
The overarching implications of my arguments are for a greater balance of 
interests between vested parties to be achieved. Developers of APIs and users thereof 
alike can engage in mutually beneficial innovation as the availability of freely usable 
APIs spurs on the next wave of software development which can be used by all parties 
to improve their programs. I have stated that one of the ironic criticisms of copyright is 
that it is a hindrance to innovation. This is one of those cases where it is best to refrain 
from constricting the law of copyright so that its ultimate purpose – to breed creativity 
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